On the public citation graph

International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0837-8
0 signed · 76 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470752135.ch1openalex-snapshot
The Problem of Social Cost
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0062openalex-snapshot
Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0648openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1044openalex-snapshot
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2236openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2251openalex-snapshot
A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23426-4_11openalex-snapshot
Just Taxation—A Positive Solution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31943-8_13openalex-snapshot
Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions at Other Scales?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2527-9_10openalex-snapshot
An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01263279openalex-snapshot
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0209-5openalex-snapshot
Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0067-9openalex-snapshot
The gamma-core and coalition formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0152-yopenalex-snapshot
Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050041openalex-snapshot
The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0558-6openalex-snapshot
Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0630-xopenalex-snapshot
Economic theory and the global environment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0770-2openalex-snapshot
Information and size of coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0814-2openalex-snapshot
Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050204openalex-snapshot
Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(92)90095-eopenalex-snapshot
Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006openalex-snapshot
Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.06.003openalex-snapshot
Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.012openalex-snapshot
Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00117-7openalex-snapshot
Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173759openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Social Situations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/286866openalex-snapshot
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/323275openalex-snapshot
Coalitional Power and Public Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/121/32openalex-snapshot
Theory of games and economic behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpl028openalex-snapshot
International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198293293.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00262.xopenalex-snapshot
Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.20.11.1472openalex-snapshot
An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128468openalex-snapshot
International Games on Climate Change Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128588openalex-snapshot
Environmental Coalitions with Heterogeneous Countries: Burden-Sharing and Carbon Leakage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2593openalex-snapshot
Equity, Heterogeneity and International Environmental Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/134972openalex-snapshot
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/136377openalex-snapshot
Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888openalex-snapshot
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888.00011openalex-snapshot
Endogenous formation of economic coalitions: a survey of the partition function approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781950173openalex-snapshot
The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2003/2004
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781950173.00011openalex-snapshot
Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2092796openalex-extracted
Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2556048openalex-extracted
International environmental agreements with support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2596789openalex-extracted
Track and Trade: A Liability Approach to Climate Policy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186002openalex-extracted
International Environmental Agreements - Stability with Transfers Among Countries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269399openalex-extracted
Overlapping Climate Clubs Under Transaction Costs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4046423openalex-extracted
International Trade Linkage in Climate Change Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5033617openalex-extracted
Efficient, Fair and Stable Agreements for Marine Plastic Pollution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.688961openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_15-1openalex-snapshot
Resource Economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_16-1openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Games of International Pollution Control: A Selective Review
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_15openalex-snapshot
Resource Economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_16openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Games of International Pollution Control: A Selective Review
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0597-3openalex-snapshot
Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0148-1openalex-snapshot
International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00505-1openalex-snapshot
Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00867-wopenalex-snapshot
International Cooperation and Kantian Moral Behaviour: Complements or Substitutes?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-019-00313-8openalex-snapshot
Microeconomic models of a production economy with environmental externalities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-024-05307-9openalex-snapshot
The impact of abatement technology difference on optimal allowance trading scheme under the stability of international environmental agreement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.11.014openalex-snapshot
The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104036openalex-snapshot
A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105335openalex-snapshot
A unifying framework for climate cooperation: The role of technology and preferences in coalition formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.06.003openalex-snapshot
Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.02.001openalex-snapshot
International environmental agreements with support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102955openalex-snapshot
International environmental agreements when countries behave morally
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103045openalex-snapshot
Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105321openalex-snapshot
Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105593openalex-snapshot
Climate coalitions with sophisticated policy makers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764116openalex-snapshot
Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5502776openalex-snapshot
From Free Riding under Uncertainty to Designing Efficient Coalitions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6035782openalex-snapshot
Coalition Formation in Public-Good Games and the Power of Information Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6442197openalex-snapshot
Coalition Formation in Public-Good Games and the Power of Information Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3197/096327117x14847335385553openalex-snapshot
Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/cli13030050openalex-snapshot
Coalition Formation with Cooperation-Enhancing Transfers When Players Are Heterogeneous and Inequality-Averse
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g13010004openalex-snapshot
Overlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g16030030openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Coalition Structures in Three-Player Symmetric Games
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.