On the public citation graph

Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0228-8
0 signed · 31 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4225-7_12openalex-snapshot
The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128122openalex-snapshot
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00193809openalex-snapshot
A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01832918openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00223-0openalex-snapshot
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938268openalex-snapshot
The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4776607openalex-extracted
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_24openalex-snapshot
Exit in Social Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2openalex-snapshot
On Exiting After Voting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0323-yopenalex-snapshot
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0530-9openalex-snapshot
The division problem with voluntary participation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6openalex-snapshot
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0957-0openalex-snapshot
Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01263-1openalex-snapshot
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-017-9369-5openalex-snapshot
Computational aspects of strategic behaviour in elections with top-truncated ballots
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.004openalex-snapshot
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002openalex-snapshot
Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012openalex-snapshot
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.001openalex-snapshot
The capacity constrained facility location problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.009openalex-snapshot
Core thresholds of symmetric majority voting games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103129openalex-snapshot
Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.09.004openalex-snapshot
The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00223-0openalex-snapshot
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Social Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2007-0203openalex-snapshot
Indifferences and Domain Restrictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0091openalex-snapshot
On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10026openalex-snapshot
Reinstating Combinatorial Protections for Manipulation and Bribery in Single-Peaked and Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11577openalex-snapshot
Incomplete Preferences in Single-Peaked Electorates
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-682-8-63openalex-snapshot
Modeling Single-Peakedness for Votes with Ties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2111.01566openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.