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Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0099-x
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0643openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2618openalex-snapshot
Manipulation through Bribes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2940openalex-snapshot
Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00128122openalex-snapshot
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00177662openalex-snapshot
Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179209openalex-snapshot
An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213663openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213810openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050348openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050043openalex-snapshot
Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00019-xopenalex-snapshot
Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00823-2openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4420(85)80004-5openalex-snapshot
Chapter 1 A brief history of fiscal doctrine
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076openalex-snapshot
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00006openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911220openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911681openalex-snapshot
Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083openalex-snapshot
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1925895openalex-snapshot
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297198openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297983openalex-snapshot
Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938268openalex-snapshot
The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951697openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proof Exchange

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Preference Manipulations Lead to the Uniform Rule
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Bribe-Proof Division of a Private Good
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4668054openalex-extracted
Endowments-Swapping-Proofness in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4841907openalex-extracted
Endowments-Swapping-Proofness in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.989687openalex-extracted
Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_72openalex-snapshot
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_23openalex-snapshot
Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00767-zopenalex-snapshot
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0openalex-snapshot
Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0289-1openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0370-zopenalex-snapshot
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of the Uniform Rule With Several Commodities and Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0733-3openalex-snapshot
Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0834-7openalex-snapshot
Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0888-1openalex-snapshot
A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1068-2openalex-snapshot
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01554-xopenalex-snapshot
Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-020-00184-7openalex-snapshot
On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023openalex-snapshot
Secure implementation in allotment economies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.011openalex-snapshot
Group strategyproofness in queueing models
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.005openalex-snapshot
On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010openalex-snapshot
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003openalex-snapshot
Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006openalex-snapshot
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.002openalex-snapshot
Coalitional manipulation on networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001openalex-snapshot
A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105879openalex-snapshot
Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.019openalex-snapshot
The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont’s characterization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.005openalex-snapshot
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.002openalex-snapshot
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Social Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12282openalex-snapshot
Securely implementable social choice functions in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12387openalex-snapshot
Group Identification with (Incomplete) Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te1214openalex-snapshot
Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2012.25103openalex-snapshot
Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1512.04277openalex-snapshot
Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
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