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Communist party committee direct control and the market value of corporate cash holdings
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0849-2openalex-snapshot
Reactivity and Passivity After Enforcement Actions: Better Late Than Never
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.018openalex-snapshot
Communist party control and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.10.005openalex-snapshot
Determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from spin-offs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2004.08.001openalex-snapshot
Political control and performance in China's listed firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.03.002openalex-snapshot
Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.002openalex-snapshot
Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.07.005openalex-snapshot
Perks and the informativeness of stock prices in the Chinese market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.004openalex-snapshot
Founder's political connections, second generation involvement, and family firm performance: Evidence from China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.006openalex-snapshot
Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.001openalex-snapshot
The power of the pen and executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.11.005openalex-snapshot
Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.012openalex-snapshot
Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.012openalex-snapshot
Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2016.04.001openalex-snapshot
Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2openalex-snapshot
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00003-3openalex-snapshot
The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00894.xopenalex-snapshot
Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.xopenalex-snapshot
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01492.xopenalex-snapshot
Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157704openalex-snapshot
Politically Connected Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.4.1095openalex-snapshot
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/4126766openalex-snapshot
International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4770594openalex-extracted
The Synergistic Effect of the Supervision Law Amendment and Commission for Discipline Inspection Involvement: Curbing Corporate Fraud in Chinese Soes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70117openalex-snapshot
Tone Management in Earnings Communication Conferences Driven by Convertible Bond Conversion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-024-00380-7openalex-snapshot
Local party committee and labor cost asymmetry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2026.110846openalex-snapshot
Does communist culture foster corporate tax compliance? Evidence from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102161openalex-snapshot
Political Control, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Case of China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102232openalex-snapshot
When culture meets finance: Communist culture and shadow banking activities in Chinese listed firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2024.2336887openalex-snapshot
The Role of Political Party in Firm Environmental Governance: Evidence from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2018.1470541openalex-snapshot
Communist party direct control and corporate investment efficiency: evidence from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/cms-06-2020-0237openalex-snapshot
To be more philanthropic when joining the government-controlled business association? Evidence from Chinese private firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/rcf-09-2025-0052openalex-snapshot
Communist party organizations in Chinese firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12283openalex-snapshot
The organizational relationship–based political connection and debt financing: Evidence from Chinese private firms
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