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Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0858openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2813openalex-snapshot
Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01242849openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90003-xopenalex-snapshot
Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0openalex-snapshot
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.005openalex-snapshot
Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017openalex-snapshot
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.011openalex-snapshot
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00044openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.11398/economics1986.42.303openalex-snapshot
Some Properties of Weak Domination in an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382157openalex-snapshot
Kidney Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8239openalex-snapshot
Housing Markets with Indifferences: A Tale of Two Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8818openalex-snapshot
Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1079505openalex-snapshot
Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297198openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7249/r1056-1openalex-snapshot
On Cores and Indivisibility

What points at this work

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4461572openalex-extracted
On Housing Markets with Indecisive Agents
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