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Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.01.005
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2556openalex-snapshot
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5547-6_2openalex-snapshot
Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00094-gopenalex-snapshot
Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90029-xopenalex-snapshot
Incentives in government contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4openalex-snapshot
A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)01493-0openalex-snapshot
Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.010openalex-snapshot
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.003openalex-snapshot
Competition among regulators and credit market integration☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.02.008openalex-snapshot
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00130-3openalex-snapshot
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3059875openalex-snapshot
Theory of Ordinary Differential Equations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-snapshot
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00138openalex-snapshot
Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296openalex-snapshot
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345openalex-snapshot
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00125.xopenalex-snapshot
Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971231.ch3openalex-snapshot
3. Theory of Ordinary Differential Equations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556016openalex-snapshot
Contracting with Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.3.119openalex-snapshot
Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539openalex-snapshot
Supermodularity and Complementarity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.419145openalex-snapshot
Regulatory Competition and Multinational Banking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1037openalex-snapshot
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1265openalex-snapshot
Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912844openalex-snapshot
Common Agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2235329openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555512openalex-snapshot
Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555779openalex-snapshot
Auditing without Commitment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555790openalex-snapshot
Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556079openalex-snapshot
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3551283openalex-snapshot
Incentives in Government Contracting

What points at this work

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4716135openalex-extracted
Multi-regulation and Moral Hazard
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