On the public citation graph

Pairwise kidney exchange

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
0 signed · 540 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.284.22.2919openalex-snapshot
Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.293.15.1883openalex-snapshot
Kidney Paired Donation and Optimizing the Use of Live Donor Organs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0779openalex-snapshot
On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2710openalex-snapshot
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2813openalex-snapshot
Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183301openalex-snapshot
Queue allocation of indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01584082openalex-snapshot
Matroids and the greedy algorithm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100168openalex-snapshot
A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1openalex-snapshot
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050160openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(94)90130-9openalex-snapshot
Stable matchings and linear inequalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0openalex-snapshot
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.05.003openalex-snapshot
Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.008openalex-snapshot
House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00091-7openalex-snapshot
Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0041-1345(03)00169-6openalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange program
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0041-1345(98)00015-3openalex-snapshot
HLA Compatibility and Kidney Grafts From Unrelated Live Donors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00059-9openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(99)00049-1openalex-snapshot
On a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and its applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1523-1755.2000.00195.xopenalex-snapshot
Living unrelated donor kidney transplantation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1053/j.gastro.2004.05.034openalex-snapshot
The gastroenterology fellowship Match: How it failed and why it could succeed once again
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1056/nejm199706123362412openalex-snapshot
Ethics of a Paired-Kidney-Exchange Program
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmp038228openalex-snapshot
Exchanging Kidneys — Advances in Living-Donor Transplantation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261272openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262074openalex-snapshot
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1097/00007890-199711270-00017openalex-snapshot
Impact Of Hla Compatibility On Survival Of Kidney Transplants From Unrelated Live Donors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1097/00007890-200004270-00001openalex-snapshot
ETHICAL ISSUES IN INCREASING LIVING KIDNEY DONATIONS BY EXPANDING KIDNEY PAIRED EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1097/00007890-200108270-00015openalex-snapshot
PRIMUM NON NOCERE: AVOIDING HARM TO VULNERABLE WAIT LIST CANDIDATES IN AN INDIRECT KIDNEY EXCHANGE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00334openalex-snapshot
Architecture of Power Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00335openalex-snapshot
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.xopenalex-snapshot
Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26openalex-snapshot
On Representatives of Subsets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-7.1.300openalex-snapshot
Note on Independence Functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382157openalex-snapshot
Kidney Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-snapshot
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669691openalex-snapshot
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669989openalex-snapshot
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748openalex-snapshot
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.3.328.7732openalex-snapshot
Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803openalex-snapshot
Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.4.565.11224openalex-snapshot
Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911055openalex-snapshot
A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938326openalex-snapshot
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2998580openalex-snapshot
Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4153/cjm-1965-045-4openalex-snapshot
Paths, Trees, and Flowers

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4660273openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4751132openalex-extracted
On Feasible and Stable Spatial Matching Of Urban Healthcare Facilities and Population
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781119300977.ch3openalex-snapshot
Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781119300977.ch9openalex-snapshot
Organ Transplantation*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/nav.22265openalex-snapshot
Abundant Neighborhoods, Two‐Sided Markets, and Maximal Matchings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/11671411_1openalex-snapshot
“Almost Stable” Matchings in the Roommates Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09751-0_42openalex-snapshot
Acyclic preference-based systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09770-1_1openalex-snapshot
Optimizing Organ Allocation and Acceptance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_655openalex-snapshot
Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_1055openalex-snapshot
Matching and Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1690-7openalex-snapshot
Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Kidney Transplant Recipients
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1690-7_8openalex-snapshot
New Sources in Living Kidney Donation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_74openalex-snapshot
Technological Change and Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63920-4_14openalex-snapshot
Discussion of Matching Optimization Problem and Representation of Matchings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63920-4_16openalex-snapshot
Bi-Criteria Optimization of Matchings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_14openalex-snapshot
Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83508-8_39openalex-snapshot
A Query-Efficient Quantum Algorithm for Maximum Matching on General Graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14openalex-snapshot
The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_21openalex-snapshot
Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-08560-3_3openalex-snapshot
Barter Exchange with Bounded Trading Cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_32openalex-snapshot
Randomized Assignments for Barter Exchanges: Fairness vs. Efficiency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65455-3_9openalex-snapshot
Design and Planning of Organ Transplantation Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_22openalex-snapshot
Stable Roommate with Narcissistic, Single-Peaked, and Single-Crossing Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94776-1_27openalex-snapshot
Manipulation Strategies for the Rank-Maximal Matching Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74466-5_88openalex-snapshot
Acyclic Preference Systems in P2P Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76627-8_28openalex-snapshot
Upper Bounds for Stabilization in Acyclic Preference-Based Systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_48openalex-snapshot
The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_2openalex-snapshot
Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_23openalex-snapshot
Approximating Matches Made in Heaven
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_15openalex-snapshot
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_6openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items without Monetary Payments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_85openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Simulations of Kidney Exchanges
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22012-8_8openalex-snapshot
Local Matching Dynamics in Social Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_4openalex-snapshot
An Improved 2-Agent Kidney Exchange Mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_655-1openalex-snapshot
Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30850-5_24openalex-snapshot
Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UK: Algorithms and Experimentation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_19openalex-snapshot
The Regulated Market for Kidneys in Iran
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39212-2_54openalex-snapshot
Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39617-5_10openalex-snapshot
Modeling Stable Matching Problems with Answer Set Programming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-05014-6_9openalex-snapshot
The Impact of Regulation on Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27162-6_3openalex-snapshot
Angebot und Nachfrage im homogenen Polypol
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3444-5_3openalex-snapshot
Heuristic Approach to Improve the Efficiency of Maximum Weight Matching Algorithm Using Clustering
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-0218-9_20openalex-snapshot
Pareto Optimal Matching with Multilayer Preferences: How Hard Can It Be?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-4448-3_14openalex-snapshot
Fair Selection of Clearing Schemes for Kidney Exchange Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0084-3openalex-snapshot
The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01276-yopenalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01536-7openalex-snapshot
Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0991-yopenalex-snapshot
The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01627-5openalex-snapshot
Arbiter assignment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01667-5openalex-snapshot
Experimental results on the roommate problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9315-2openalex-snapshot
Three-Sided Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-015-0062-2openalex-snapshot
Greedy Matching: Guarantees and Limitations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-019-00584-7openalex-snapshot
Size Versus Truthfulness in the House Allocation Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-024-10352-6openalex-snapshot
Designing dataless neural networks for kidney exchange variants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00292-9openalex-snapshot
A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7openalex-snapshot
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-019-09426-wopenalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Multi-Item Exchange Under Single-Minded Dichotomous Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-020-09470-xopenalex-snapshot
Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-021-09503-zopenalex-snapshot
Swap dynamics in single-peaked housing markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-024-09670-9openalex-snapshot
One-sided matching markets with endowments: equilibria and algorithms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0691-4openalex-snapshot
The kidney exchange problem: How hard is it to find a donor?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10618-020-00675-yopenalex-snapshot
Fair-by-design matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9270-4openalex-snapshot
Matching markets with price bargaining
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10729-008-9089-0openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatibility in kidney exchange problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10729-017-9414-6openalex-snapshot
An efficient method for kidney allocation problem: a credibility-based fuzzy common weights data envelopment analysis approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-013-9598-8openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10916-010-9574-0openalex-snapshot
Evaluation of Kidney Transplantation Programmes Using System Simulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-018-0714-9openalex-snapshot
Satisfied surgeon–patient matching: a model-based method
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9415-6openalex-snapshot
The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-18374-6openalex-snapshot
An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon technology investment strategies based on the manufacturer-supplier matching game under government regulations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12065-020-00516-3openalex-snapshot
Dynamic kidney paired exchange using modified multiverse optimization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-008-0009-3openalex-snapshot
Self-stabilization in preference-based systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12532-023-00251-7openalex-snapshot
KidneyExchange.jl: a Julia package for solving the kidney exchange problem with branch-and-price
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12561-018-9214-7openalex-snapshot
Valuing Sets of Potential Transplants in a Kidney Paired Donation Network
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-022-00744-xopenalex-snapshot
A Systematic Review of Kidney Transplantation Decision Modelling Studies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s41478-023-00603-5openalex-snapshot
On approximating stochastic independent sets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-021-00103-wopenalex-snapshot
Toward market design in practice: a progress report
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-443-23571-9.00034-7openalex-snapshot
Liver transplantation: the recipient
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53187-2.00017-6openalex-snapshot
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hefam.2023.01.002openalex-snapshot
Mating markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesind.2021.11.010openalex-snapshot
Market design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.001openalex-snapshot
Matching under non-transferable utility: theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.003openalex-snapshot
Matching under non-transferable utility: applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.006openalex-snapshot
Dynamic matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajt.2023.06.016openalex-snapshot
The first 4-way liver paired exchange from an interdisciplinary collaboration between health care professionals and design economists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajt.2026.04.013openalex-snapshot
The impact of organ blood type conversion on kidney paired donation: A simulation and optimization study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2018.06.004openalex-snapshot
Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103261openalex-snapshot
Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2013.08.006openalex-snapshot
College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101963openalex-snapshot
When Do Stable Matching Mechanisms Fail? The Role of Standardized Tests in Chinese College Admissions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2024.110533openalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange program: An efficient compact formulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.compbiomed.2019.03.013openalex-snapshot
KPDGUI: An interactive application for optimization and management of a virtual kidney paired donation program
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2023.106470openalex-snapshot
Cutting Plane Approaches for the Robust Kidney Exchange Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.001openalex-snapshot
Independence systems in gross-substitute valuations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2020.100961openalex-snapshot
Does increasing access-to-care delay accessing of care? Evidence from kidney transplantation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.05.025openalex-snapshot
New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.027openalex-snapshot
A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.031openalex-snapshot
Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2024.08.023openalex-snapshot
Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2025.02.014openalex-snapshot
Adaptation, comparison and practical implementation of fairness schemes in Kidney Exchange Programs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2025.08.059openalex-snapshot
Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: A literature survey and empirical evaluation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2025.12.046openalex-snapshot
Computing balanced solutions for large international kidney exchange schemes when cycle length is unbounded
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ekir.2022.03.023openalex-snapshot
Kidney Paired Donation Chains Initiated by Deceased Donors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2019.01.005openalex-snapshot
FISOF: A formal industrial symbiosis opportunity filtering method
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2021.115599openalex-snapshot
Integer programming approach and application of reformulation-linearization technique to liver exchange problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.017openalex-snapshot
Random assignment under weak preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.020openalex-snapshot
ReGale: Some memorable results
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.001openalex-snapshot
The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009openalex-snapshot
Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013openalex-snapshot
Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.008openalex-snapshot
Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.007openalex-snapshot
Priority matchings revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.001openalex-snapshot
Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.006openalex-snapshot
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001openalex-snapshot
On the operation of multiple matching markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006openalex-snapshot
Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004openalex-snapshot
Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.015openalex-snapshot
Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.12.014openalex-snapshot
The effectiveness of transplant legislation, procedures and management: Cross-country evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2012.10.005openalex-snapshot
Local matching dynamics in social networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2022.104943openalex-snapshot
Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2006.09.012openalex-snapshot
Inapproximability of the kidney exchange problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2007.02.003openalex-snapshot
The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2019.05.006openalex-snapshot
RAM: A collection of mechanisms for (indivisible) resource allocation in oTree
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.124436openalex-snapshot
Two-sided matching and game on investing in carbon emission reduction technology under a cap-and-trade system
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139893openalex-snapshot
Green technology investment selection with carbon price and competition: One-to-many matching structure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.013openalex-snapshot
An experimental study on decentralized networked markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.002openalex-snapshot
Pairwise kidney exchange: Comment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.003openalex-snapshot
The roommates problem revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.018openalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.003openalex-snapshot
Bargaining and efficiency in networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016openalex-snapshot
Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.003openalex-snapshot
Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.011openalex-snapshot
How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.004openalex-snapshot
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104942openalex-snapshot
Matching with partners and projects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105197openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105472openalex-snapshot
Constrained random matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105712openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105803openalex-snapshot
Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.10.006openalex-snapshot
Removing financial barriers to organ and bone marrow donation: The effect of leave and tax legislation in the U.S.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.04.001openalex-snapshot
Solving the kidney shortage via the creation of kidney donation co-operatives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102536openalex-snapshot
Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102650openalex-snapshot
Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.007openalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange: Further utilization of donors via listed exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.006openalex-snapshot
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.006openalex-snapshot
A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.004openalex-snapshot
A task-allocation problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003openalex-snapshot
Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102465openalex-snapshot
A bargaining set for roommate problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102984openalex-snapshot
Top trading cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103170openalex-snapshot
Ekici’s reclaim-proof allocations revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103207openalex-snapshot
Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley–Scarf economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.09.003openalex-snapshot
Behavioral economic engineering
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.002openalex-snapshot
Optimal production of transplant care services
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.006openalex-snapshot
Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.004openalex-snapshot
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.10.006openalex-snapshot
Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.12.001openalex-snapshot
A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q -stable matchings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.005openalex-snapshot
Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003openalex-snapshot
Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.nephro.2014.01.001openalex-snapshot
Développer la transplantation rénale : les recommandations de la Haute Autorité de santé
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orhc.2020.100246openalex-snapshot
Maximum matchings in graphs for allocating kidney paired donation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.02.010openalex-snapshot
A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.06.002openalex-snapshot
Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.02.009openalex-snapshot
Half-cycle: A new formulation for modelling kidney exchange problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2025.107381openalex-snapshot
A simplified analysis of the ascending auction to sell a matroid base
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2021.03.001openalex-snapshot
The Stable Marriage Problem: An interdisciplinary review from the physicist’s perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2021.06.001openalex-snapshot
Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2007.04.029openalex-snapshot
Efficient algorithms for generalized Stable Marriage and Roommates problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2010.02.003openalex-snapshot
Size versus stability in the marriage problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.01.022openalex-snapshot
“Almost stable” matchings in the Roommates problem with bounded preference lists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.013openalex-snapshot
An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2026.115901openalex-snapshot
Pareto optimal matching with multilayer preferences: How hard can it be?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2024.123686openalex-snapshot
Scarcity and market design: How effective matching can promote the peer-to-peer sharing economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.transproceed.2011.06.001openalex-snapshot
Effectiveness of Different Kidney Exchange Mechanisms to Improve Living Donor Transplantation in Chile
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2016.08.017openalex-snapshot
Private parking slot sharing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2024.104916openalex-snapshot
Reinforced stable matching for Crowd-Sourced Delivery Systems under stochastic driver acceptance behavior
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2019.06.002openalex-snapshot
A dynamic crowdshipping model and daily travel behavior
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Social Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139060011.002openalex-snapshot
Matching Markets: Theory and Practice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316779309openalex-snapshot
Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316779309.011openalex-snapshot
Kidney Exchange and Stable Matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0963180121000955openalex-snapshot
Ethical Solutions to the Problem of Organ Shortage
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s147106841600003xopenalex-snapshot
Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1471068420000277openalex-snapshot
A General Framework for Stable Roommates Problems using Answer Set Programming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03788-6openalex-snapshot
Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1056/nejmoa0803645openalex-snapshot
A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2313-1openalex-snapshot
Matching and Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2873-1openalex-snapshot
Roth, Alvin (Born 1951)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2313openalex-snapshot
Matching and Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/s41274-016-0174-3openalex-snapshot
Kidney exchange simulation and optimization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2106652118openalex-snapshot
Global kidney chains
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2024.2320175openalex-snapshot
Application of Gale-Shapley algorithm in optimal matching for healthcare facilities to elderly population: the case of Hangzhou, China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/08839514.2021.1999595openalex-snapshot
Dormitory Assignment Using a Genetic Algorithm
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2021.2024364openalex-snapshot
Can the university matching mechanism in Malaysia do better? An experimental evaluation of three matching mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/15427951.2008.10129167openalex-snapshot
The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally Ranked Pairs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2010.494374openalex-snapshot
GIFT-GIVING OR MARKET?
showing the first 200 of 485
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.