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Friendship and Belief

https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640409485146
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511621253.011openalex-snapshot
Deciding to believe
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107360525.002openalex-snapshot
THE WILL TO BELIEVE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2026228openalex-snapshot
Moral Saints

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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From Mic to Market: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Podcast Appearances
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Iris Murdoch and the Epistemic Significance of Love
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On the Contours of a Conversation
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Reimagining Ethics: The Legacy of Environmental Ethics
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment
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Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
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Delusions, Evidence, and the Limits of Epistemic Classification
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A Lover’s Shame
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How Aristotelians Can Make Faith a Virtue
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Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging
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Epistemic Partiality and the Nature of Friendship
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Insult and Injustice in Epistemic Partiality
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It’s Friendship, Jim, but Not as We Know It: A Degrees-of-Friendship View of Human–Robot Friendships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9803-5openalex-snapshot
Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9953-0openalex-snapshot
Friendship and epistemic norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0413-xopenalex-snapshot
Disagreement and the value of self-trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0885-6openalex-snapshot
The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony
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On having bad persons as friends
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Distinctive duress
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01469-0openalex-snapshot
“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01535-7openalex-snapshot
Regrettable beliefs
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Inquiry and the epistemic
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02012-7openalex-snapshot
Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02053-yopenalex-snapshot
Against the newer evidentialists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02489-yopenalex-snapshot
Moral disagreement is special
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09734-xopenalex-snapshot
Pascal, Pascalberg, and friends
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-023-03064-2openalex-snapshot
The Extension of Particularized Trust to Generalized Trust: The Moderating Role of Long-term Versus Short-term Orientation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0129-4openalex-snapshot
Partiality and prejudice in trusting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1521-xopenalex-snapshot
Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02389-1openalex-snapshot
The value of truth and the normativity of evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02787-wopenalex-snapshot
Epistemically flawless false beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02799-6openalex-snapshot
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02833-7openalex-snapshot
On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02892-wopenalex-snapshot
The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03440-wopenalex-snapshot
Anxious feelings, anxious friends: on anxiety and friendship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03562-9openalex-snapshot
Loving truly: An epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03613-1openalex-snapshot
Epistemic redress
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03686-yopenalex-snapshot
Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03872-yopenalex-snapshot
You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05419-3openalex-snapshot
Ambiguity of doxastic ought and responsibility for belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05449-5openalex-snapshot
Why committing epistemic injustice against close friends can be distinctively bad
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-026-00979-1openalex-snapshot
The Structure of Epistemic Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-026-01027-8openalex-snapshot
Friendship and Epistemic Injustice: A Reply to Warman
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-009-9080-yopenalex-snapshot
Willfully Blind for Good Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104513openalex-snapshot
Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.19openalex-snapshot
THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE IN THE REALIZATION OF BASIC GOODS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.24openalex-snapshot
RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.23openalex-snapshot
On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.26openalex-snapshot
A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2024.66openalex-snapshot
A Case for Caregiver Testimony about the Cognitively Disabled
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217325000022openalex-snapshot
Patriotic Doxastic Partialism: Canada and the Cognitive Norms of Patriotism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819118000335openalex-snapshot
What Does Belief Have to Do with Truth?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819123000396openalex-snapshot
Being Open-Minded about Open-Mindedness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000744openalex-snapshot
Scientism and the value of scientific evidence for religious belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001761openalex-snapshot
Trusting information from friends: Adults expect it but preschoolers do not.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003997_7openalex-snapshot
Friendships: Epistemically Dangerous Liaisons?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1115530openalex-snapshot
Virtue and Salience
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2487074openalex-snapshot
The Ethics of Disbelief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2020.1729235openalex-snapshot
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2058080openalex-snapshot
The loving state
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1433794openalex-snapshot
The guise of the good and the problem of partiality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2145857openalex-snapshot
Defining Wokeness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2016.1188544openalex-snapshot
Amicably Deceived
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1440952openalex-snapshot
Giving the Benefit of the Doubt
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1997391openalex-snapshot
Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2024.2309050openalex-snapshot
What is an ally?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1287293openalex-snapshot
On the special insult of refusing testimony
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2022.2115533openalex-snapshot
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2019.1660457openalex-snapshot
Academic friendship in dark times
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2024.2367073openalex-snapshot
Book Symposium: Alfred Archer and Jake Wojtowicz’s Why it’s OK to be a Sports Fan
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.2000186openalex-snapshot
The Doxastic Norms of Faith: Reply to Commentators
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.2000187openalex-snapshot
True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.2000193openalex-snapshot
Faith: How to be Partial while Respecting the Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/428458openalex-snapshot
Patriotism as Bad Faith
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/736735openalex-snapshot
The Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Sovereign Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Introduction to Part I
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Scope of Rational Self-Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Governing Abilities of Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Interests of Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Laws of Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0008openalex-snapshot
The Sovereignty of Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Introduction to Part II
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Explanation, Unity, Specificity, Affinity, and Harmony
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0012openalex-snapshot
Rational Nature
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Knowledge, Error, and Enlightenment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0014openalex-snapshot
Freedoms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0015openalex-snapshot
Happiness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0016openalex-snapshot
Natural Perfection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0017openalex-snapshot
Respect and Expressions of Respect
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0018openalex-snapshot
Solidarity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0019openalex-snapshot
Postscript
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191960253.003.0020openalex-snapshot
Abbreviations for Kant’s Works
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Trust and Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Trust, Reliance, and Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Nature of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0004openalex-snapshot
The Reasons of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Telling and Trusting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Our Liberty to Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Social Dimensions of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780192585325.003.0002openalex-snapshot
On the Very Idea of an Epistemic Dilemma
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197510926.003.0024openalex-snapshot
Morality and Epistemic Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Deductive Moral Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Moral Foundations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Morally Repugnant Beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Moral Deduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0005openalex-snapshot
The Justification of Deduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Moral Quandaries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197849507.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Beyond Morality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197905210.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Working on Yourself
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780198972785.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Interpretation under Oppression
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac034openalex-snapshot
The interests behind directed doxastic wrongs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad100openalex-snapshot
If epistemic partialism is true, don’t tell your friends
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aov001openalex-snapshot
II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onab006openalex-snapshot
Proselytism as Epistemic Violence: A Jewish Approach to the Ethics of Religious Persuasion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae142openalex-snapshot
Interpersonal hope and loving attention
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13023openalex-snapshot
Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01100.xopenalex-snapshot
A Feminist Interpretation of Hume on Testimony
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12105openalex-snapshot
Friendship and Bias: Ethical and Epistemic Considerations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12601openalex-snapshot
Explain Yourself: The Ethics of Soliciting Advice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12253openalex-snapshot
Believing for Practical Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12352openalex-snapshot
Bias and interpersonal skepticism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70025openalex-snapshot
Believe It or Not: Transparency Is False
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70049openalex-snapshot
A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12277openalex-snapshot
Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12423openalex-snapshot
The Cognitive Demands of Friendship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12860openalex-snapshot
The ethics of partiality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12896openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Partialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12205openalex-snapshot
The ethics of believing out loud
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12061openalex-snapshot
Against the New Evidentialists
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12268openalex-snapshot
Understanding friendship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12124openalex-snapshot
Varieties of Moral Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.70014openalex-snapshot
De‐Moralizing Friendship: Unfinished Business
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13140openalex-snapshot
Agnostic wrongs and pragmatic disencroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70075openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Respect
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70140openalex-snapshot
External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12514openalex-snapshot
Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12557openalex-snapshot
An argument for moral evidentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1695openalex-snapshot
Belief in a Fallen World
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717724613openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic Belief and Political Agency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x211052652openalex-snapshot
What should relational egalitarians believe?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8012843openalex-snapshot
The Game of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0008openalex-snapshot
What is Friendship?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2025.0131openalex-snapshot
Augustine on Evidentiary Thresholds and Belief in Friendship
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5406/21521123.61.3.03openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Partialism and Taking Our Friends Seriously
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184612openalex-snapshot
Belief for Someone Else’s Sake
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184613openalex-snapshot
Why Epistemic Partiality is Overrated
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184614openalex-snapshot
Moral Agency in Believing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184615openalex-snapshot
Believing in Others
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184617openalex-snapshot
When Beliefs Wrong
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20184619openalex-snapshot
Doxastic Morality
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