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Comparative Politics and Public Finance
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00075-4openalex-snapshot
Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(03)00039-3openalex-snapshot
Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(02)00082-4openalex-snapshot
Testing for tax smoothing in a general equilibrium model of growth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(03)00035-1openalex-snapshot
How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0573-8555(06)79001-0openalex-snapshot
Designing Europe – A Survey of Tasks Ahead
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0573-8555(06)79002-2openalex-snapshot
In Praise of the European Constitution: A Political Economics Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0573-8555(06)79005-8openalex-snapshot
The EU Budget: How much Scope for Institutional Reform?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0954-349x(02)00007-3openalex-snapshot
Growth of government and the politics of fiscal policy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1474-6670(17)40488-5openalex-snapshot
On the Constitutional Choice of a Democratic Voting Rule: An Experimental Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1572-8323(08)05005-4openalex-snapshot
Liberalisation, democratisation and the distribution of urban local public goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4420(02)80028-3openalex-snapshot
Political Economics and Public Finance**We thank a number of colleagues – especially Alan Auerbach, David Baron, Tim Besley, Francesco Daveri, Avinash Dixit, and Gerard Roland – and Ph.D. students – especially Gisela Waisman – for comments on earlier drafts. Christina Lönnblad and Alessandra…
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0080(04)80011-7openalex-snapshot
Chapter 54 Urban political economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.001openalex-snapshot
The American Political Economy: A Framework and Agenda for Research
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.002openalex-snapshot
Hurdles to Shared Prosperity: Congress, Parties, and the National Policy Process in an Era of Inequality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.003openalex-snapshot
The Role of the Law in the American Political Economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.004openalex-snapshot
Collective Action, Law, and the Fragmented Development of the American Labor Movement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.005openalex-snapshot
Racial Inequality, Market Inequality, and the American Political Economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.006openalex-snapshot
The Production of Local Inequality: Race, Class, and Land Use in American Cities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.007openalex-snapshot
The City Re-centered? Local Inequality Mitigation in the 21st Century
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.008openalex-snapshot
The Political Economies of Red States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.009openalex-snapshot
Mo’ Patents, Mo’ Problems: Corporate Strategy, Structure, and Profitability in America’s Political Economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.010openalex-snapshot
Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.011openalex-snapshot
Labor Market Power in the American Political Economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.012openalex-snapshot
The United States as Radical Innovation Driver: The Politics of Declining Dominance?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.013openalex-snapshot
Public Investment in the Knowledge Economy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.014openalex-snapshot
Concentration and Commodification: The Political Economy of Postindustrialism in America and Beyond
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009029841.015openalex-snapshot
The American Political Economy Confronts COVID-19
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655934.006openalex-snapshot
Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality in Latin America*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108764445.005openalex-snapshot
Positive Constitutional Economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108764445.006openalex-snapshot
Conclusions and Possible Future Issues
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108764445.007openalex-snapshot
Coding Countries according to Two Governance Scores
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108764445.008openalex-snapshot
Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules As Explanatory Variables and Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2024.7openalex-snapshot
Policy Diffusion, Environmental Federalism, and Economic Efficiency – How Institutions Influence the Implementation of EU Legislation in Two Nordic Countries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492433.002openalex-snapshot
The new governance of Europe: parliamentary or presidential?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493508.016openalex-snapshot
Policy options for reforming the welfare state
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