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Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
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Electoral Messages from the District: Explaining Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2011.642058openalex-snapshot
Issue Salience, Subconstituency Politics, and Legislative Representation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/07343469509507864openalex-snapshot
Shirking and Ideology: Defense in the Senate
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/08913810008443561openalex-snapshot
What economists say (and don't say) about politics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2011.635871openalex-snapshot
SELF-INTEREST AND PUBLIC INTEREST: THE MOTIVATIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.589579openalex-snapshot
Complex constituencies: intense environmentalists and representation
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