On the public citation graph
Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining
0 signed · 50 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1041openalex-snapshot
Option Values and Bargaining Delays
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0076openalex-snapshot
A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1005openalex-snapshot
An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1087openalex-snapshot
Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2820openalex-snapshot
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0102-xopenalex-snapshot
The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.003openalex-snapshot
Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008openalex-snapshot
Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001openalex-snapshot
The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.008openalex-snapshot
Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055407070037openalex-snapshot
Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123401000242openalex-snapshot
Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/686747openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy013openalex-snapshot
Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00069openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00389openalex-snapshot
A Structural Model of Government Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.xopenalex-snapshot
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00632.xopenalex-snapshot
The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.1openalex-snapshot
MODELS OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466278openalex-snapshot
Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531openalex-snapshot
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912573openalex-snapshot
Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957393openalex-snapshot
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1958776openalex-snapshot
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1962882openalex-snapshot
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171772openalex-snapshot
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067openalex-snapshot
A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555382openalex-snapshot
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2586114openalex-snapshot
Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3088432openalex-snapshot
The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7883openalex-snapshot
The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4767029openalex-extracted
Unity in Diversity: How Norms of Compromise Enable Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4817350openalex-extracted
Bargaining Under the Threat of a Nuclear Option
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01551-0openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Technocratic Governments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01628-4openalex-snapshot
Optimal Democratic Mechanisms: Should Minorities Propose First?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010openalex-snapshot
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2026.107518openalex-snapshot
A stochastic bargaining game with pre-surplus realization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2026.10118openalex-snapshot
Policymaking activities of caretaker governments in Western Europe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2025.2520607openalex-snapshot
You’re the one I want: Substitutability, policy preference divergence, and the cost of multilateral sanctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4568811openalex-snapshot
Propagation and Deterrence of Unpunishable Collusion in Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4602771openalex-snapshot
Unity in Diversity: How Norms of Compromise Enable Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5800871openalex-snapshot
Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7430061openalex-snapshot
Who Should Be in Your Coalition? Size and Composition Inefficiencies in Legislative Bargaining
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.