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The Evolution of Pollution Auctions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0781openalex-snapshot
Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1993.1001openalex-snapshot
An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1993.1041openalex-snapshot
Seller Incentive Properties of EPA′s Emission Trading Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0010openalex-snapshot
EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00145121openalex-snapshot
Promoting efficiency and equity through institutional design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1openalex-snapshot
Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9377-2openalex-snapshot
Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9839-zopenalex-snapshot
Auctioning Versus Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-015-9939-4openalex-snapshot
Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-021-00543-3openalex-snapshot
An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0401-8openalex-snapshot
Rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(76)90014-1openalex-snapshot
Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.07.013openalex-snapshot
Why Have Greenhouse Emissions in RGGI States Declined? An Econometric Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy Factors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.105033openalex-snapshot
Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.04.041openalex-snapshot
Consignment auctions of free emissions allowances
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.05.002openalex-snapshot
Auctions with resale when private values are uncertain: Evidence from the lab and field
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.005openalex-snapshot
Permit market auctions with allowance reserves
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcomm.2018.07.003openalex-snapshot
The consignment mechanism in carbon markets: A laboratory investigation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.007openalex-snapshot
Elements of emission market design: An experimental analysis of California's market for greenhouse gas allowances
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.002openalex-snapshot
Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.11.004openalex-snapshot
Soft and hard price collars in a cap-and-trade system: A comparative analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.01.003openalex-snapshot
Reprint of: Price and quantity collars for stabilizing emission allowance prices: Laboratory experiments on the EU ETS market stability reserve
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.003openalex-snapshot
Emissions trading systems with cap adjustments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.006openalex-snapshot
Procrastinating reform: The impact of the market stability reserve on the EU ETS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009openalex-snapshot
Strategic trade in pollution permits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.04.006openalex-snapshot
Permit markets, market power, and the trade-off between efficiency and revenue raising
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00118-9openalex-snapshot
Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00128-7openalex-snapshot
A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0301-4215(01)00100-8openalex-snapshot
Tradeable carbon permit auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0120-2openalex-snapshot
New EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/706792openalex-snapshot
The Future of US Carbon-Pricing Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rem003openalex-snapshot
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/ren016openalex-snapshot
Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve for Cap-and-Trade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/req024openalex-snapshot
Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rey019openalex-snapshot
Policy Brief—Using Lessons from Reverse Auctions for Renewables to Deliver Energy Storage Capacity: Guidance for Policymakers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu023openalex-snapshot
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/6.4.733openalex-snapshot
Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00522.xopenalex-snapshot
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1201/ebk1439809624-22openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Air Pollution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161218openalex-snapshot
Expecting the Unexpected: Emissions Uncertainty and Environmental Market Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.399openalex-snapshot
Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.496openalex-snapshot
A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0041openalex-snapshot
Auctioning Emission Permits with Market Power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3368/le.89.3.387openalex-snapshot
Adverse Selection in Reverse Auctions for Ecosystem Services
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2009.0055openalex-snapshot
Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781936331277openalex-snapshot
Private Rights in Public Resources
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4062959openalex-extracted
The Effects of Seemingly Nonbinding Price Floors: An Experimental Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5354164openalex-extracted
Emissions Trading with Supply Adjustment Mechanisms and Market Power
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00673-2openalex-snapshot
Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2024.101647openalex-snapshot
Advancing ecosystem services auctions: Insights from an international Delphi panel
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2026.102200openalex-snapshot
Designing an optimized carbon pricing framework: Integrating supply, demand, and governance for effective carbon market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104583openalex-snapshot
The effects of seemingly nonbinding price floors: An experimental analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102620openalex-snapshot
Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable allowance supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009408080.004openalex-snapshot
Transaction Cost Reduction or Rent-Seeking in Provision of a Public Good
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01560-wopenalex-snapshot
Financials threaten to undermine the functioning of emissions markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/720690openalex-snapshot
Price-Responsive Allowance Supply in Emissions Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/721755openalex-snapshot
Investment Incentives in Tradable Emissions Markets with Price Floors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac63d6openalex-snapshot
Shifting concerns for the EU ETS: are carbon prices becoming too high?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/greentech58819.2024.10520613openalex-snapshot
Auction of Pollution Permits in a Multi-Pollutant Setting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111820-030145openalex-snapshot
The Market Stability Reserve in the EU Emissions Trading System: A Critical Review
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.64628/aa.gs7xfpcajopenalex-snapshot
Australia may be heading for emissions trading between big polluters
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.64628/aa.v4kjqg933openalex-snapshot
Taxes out, subsidies in: Australia and the US are passing major climate bills – without taxing carbon
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