On the public citation graph

IX—Moral Encroachment

https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy007
0 signed · 226 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394268054openalex-snapshot
Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3783-1openalex-snapshot
Feminist Metaphysics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3783-1_11openalex-snapshot
Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-010-9095-6openalex-snapshot
“We are all Different”: Statistical Discrimination and the Right to be Treated as an Individual
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0182-yopenalex-snapshot
Belief, credence, and norms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0461-xopenalex-snapshot
Evidence against pragmatic encroachment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1072-0openalex-snapshot
A racial classification for medical genetics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0234-4openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0349-2openalex-snapshot
Introduction, SI of Synthese “The collective dimension of science”
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0361-6openalex-snapshot
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s12129-004-1009-2openalex-snapshot
Profiles, probabilities, and stereotypes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400801886397openalex-snapshot
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347531openalex-snapshot
Knowledge, assertion and lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640409485143openalex-snapshot
Stereotypes And Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and its Limits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0199288038.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Practical Interests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Causal Cognition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664313.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664313.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Treating People as Individuals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121openalex-snapshot
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aov001openalex-snapshot
II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/32.4.375openalex-snapshot
A PROBLEM FOR RELATIVE INFORMATION MINIMIZERS IN PROBABILITY KINEMATICS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12265openalex-snapshot
Internalized Oppression and Its Varied Moral Harms: Self‐Perceptions of Reduced Agency and Criminality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00026.xopenalex-snapshot
Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00768.xopenalex-snapshot
The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00326.xopenalex-snapshot
Racial Profiling Versus Community
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00070.xopenalex-snapshot
Interest‐Relative Invariantism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00280.xopenalex-snapshot
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.xopenalex-snapshot
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12017openalex-snapshot
Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12075openalex-snapshot
Two Kinds of Stakes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12203openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12415openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1728705openalex-snapshot
Epistemology Formalized
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2107917openalex-snapshot
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2998423openalex-snapshot
Knowing and Asserting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjz82xmopenalex-snapshot
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051022openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2010107625openalex-snapshot
On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2011248openalex-snapshot
Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-6408openalex-snapshot
Contemporary debates in applied ethics

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3767944openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781119616702.biblioopenalex-snapshot
Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94170-3_12openalex-snapshot
An Epistemic Defense of Animism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74069-5_3openalex-snapshot
On the Contours of a Conversation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-12193-6_6openalex-snapshot
Environmental Equilibrium, Life and Morality: Spiritual Fascination Through the Animated Tales from Earthsea and The Red Turtle
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00238-zopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00602-1openalex-snapshot
Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00626-7openalex-snapshot
Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1openalex-snapshot
Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00799-3openalex-snapshot
Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01052-1openalex-snapshot
What if I Am Wrong? A Defence of Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10352-2openalex-snapshot
Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10408-xopenalex-snapshot
Doxastic Affirmative Action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10426-9openalex-snapshot
Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-026-10570-yopenalex-snapshot
Sovereign Credit Ratings, Transparency, and Algorithms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1219-zopenalex-snapshot
What we epistemically owe to each other
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01359-0openalex-snapshot
Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01535-7openalex-snapshot
Regrettable beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01563-3openalex-snapshot
What it means to respect individuality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01641-0openalex-snapshot
Problems with purely pragmatic belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01672-7openalex-snapshot
Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01949-zopenalex-snapshot
The structure of moral encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01969-9openalex-snapshot
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01983-xopenalex-snapshot
Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02319-7openalex-snapshot
A (Consequence-Oriented) critique of the argument from inductive risk
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-025-02412-xopenalex-snapshot
Moral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02372-wopenalex-snapshot
Demographic statistics in defensive decisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02668-2openalex-snapshot
Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02799-6openalex-snapshot
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02848-0openalex-snapshot
A case for integrative epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03042-6openalex-snapshot
Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03104-9openalex-snapshot
Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03201-9openalex-snapshot
Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03422-yopenalex-snapshot
Prejudiced beliefs based on the evidence: responding to a challenge for evidentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03731-wopenalex-snapshot
The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03872-yopenalex-snapshot
You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04054-0openalex-snapshot
Equalized odds is a requirement of algorithmic fairness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04271-7openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic encroachment and justified group belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04448-0openalex-snapshot
Radical epistemology, theory choice, and the priority of the epistemic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04855-xopenalex-snapshot
Wronging in believing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05151-yopenalex-snapshot
Disagreement, dogmatism, moral encroachment & Wittgensteinian etiquette
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05770-zopenalex-snapshot
Prior adjustments and moral encroachment on credences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-025-00642-6openalex-snapshot
Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00762-8openalex-snapshot
Toward an Ethics of AI Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00163-wopenalex-snapshot
Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does not
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00172-9openalex-snapshot
Knowledge, algorithmic predictions, and action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315203openalex-snapshot
Opinion Pooling
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009472951openalex-snapshot
Shifty Epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755openalex-snapshot
Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.002openalex-snapshot
Rational Belief and Statistical Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.003openalex-snapshot
Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.004openalex-snapshot
The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.005openalex-snapshot
Three Puzzles about Lotteries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.006openalex-snapshot
Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs Are Justified
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.007openalex-snapshot
Rethinking the Lottery Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.008openalex-snapshot
Rational Belief in Lottery- and Preface-Situations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.009openalex-snapshot
Stability and the Lottery Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.010openalex-snapshot
The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.011openalex-snapshot
Beliefs, Probabilities, and Their Coherent Correspondence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.012openalex-snapshot
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.013openalex-snapshot
Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108379755.014openalex-snapshot
Index
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.16openalex-snapshot
Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.31openalex-snapshot
A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.28openalex-snapshot
Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.28openalex-snapshot
Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.50openalex-snapshot
Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.23openalex-snapshot
On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.38openalex-snapshot
Encroachment on Emotion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.7openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2021.47openalex-snapshot
Knowing How to Feel: Racism, Resilience, and Affective Resistance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x21000777openalex-snapshot
The logic of challenging research into bias and social disparity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-43243-yopenalex-snapshot
Ethical concerns about embodied brain organoids shaped by foundational distinctions and perceptions of consciousness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1926522openalex-snapshot
Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1982999openalex-snapshot
Doxastic Wronging and Evidentialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2030378openalex-snapshot
Uncoordinated Norms of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2487074openalex-snapshot
The Ethics of Disbelief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2505617openalex-snapshot
Fit-related Reasons to Inquire
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2521043openalex-snapshot
What Is Culpable About Culpable Moral Ignorance?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2554625openalex-snapshot
Permissivism and Mismatched Granularity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2020.1729235openalex-snapshot
Ethics and epistemic hopelessness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2124540openalex-snapshot
Bounded emotionality and our doxastic norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228openalex-snapshot
Precis of prejudice: a study in non-ideal epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2024.2367767openalex-snapshot
On the culpable ignorance of group agents: the group justification thesis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2024.2386553openalex-snapshot
Presuppositional epistemic contextualism and non-ideal contexts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2145857openalex-snapshot
Defining Wokeness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2025.2469186openalex-snapshot
In Defense of Robust Moral Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2024.2344973openalex-snapshot
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/705764openalex-snapshot
Profile Evidence, Fairness, and the Risks of Mistaken Convictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/736735openalex-snapshot
The Constitutive Inheritance Account of the Ethical Significance of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.002.0006openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Standing Up For Neutrality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Centrality of One’s Own Life
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0004openalex-snapshot
On the Moral Objection to Coercion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0005openalex-snapshot
The Relevance of Formative Circumstances to Blameworthiness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Responsibility, Justice, and Solidarity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Problem of Self-Torture
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Transmission Failures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Intention and Prediction in Means–End Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Self-Prediction in Practical Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Collective Obligations and the Ethics of Participation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0012openalex-snapshot
Practical Commitment and Knowledge of Intentional Action
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Action and Production
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0014openalex-snapshot
Unproductive Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0015openalex-snapshot
Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0016openalex-snapshot
How Can Beliefs Wrong?—A Strawsonian Epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191997273.003.0017openalex-snapshot
Disagreement and Alienation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Trust and Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Trust, Reliance, and Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0003openalex-snapshot
The Nature of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0004openalex-snapshot
The Reasons of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Telling and Trusting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Our Liberty to Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191999284.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Social Dimensions of Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780192585325.003.0016openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Prejudice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197510926.003.0024openalex-snapshot
Morality and Epistemic Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Judging One's Own Case
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.002.0006openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Self-Awareness and Higher-Order Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Self-Assessment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Judging One’s Own Case
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Modeling Rational Belief for Self-Aware Subjects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Assessing the Model, and Principle for Self-Aware Believing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Dilemmas
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Self-Aware Believing and Epistemic Akrasia
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Self-Aware Believing and Self-Undermining Accounts of Rational Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197851708.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Self-Aware Believing and Skepticism About Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780198972785.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Interpretation under Oppression
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780198975847.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Moral Encroachment and #BelieveWomen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayac074openalex-snapshot
Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac034openalex-snapshot
The interests behind directed doxastic wrongs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa010openalex-snapshot
IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoab015openalex-snapshot
III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf045openalex-snapshot
Psychiatry, Pathology, and Disease: Some Benefits of Philosophical Reflection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzae029openalex-snapshot
How to Do Without Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niag023openalex-snapshot
Views on the distribution of consciousness influence ethical judgements toward brain organoids as biological computers: an exploratory study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac051openalex-snapshot
Are Public Reason Liberalism’s Epistemological Commitments Indefensible?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz006openalex-snapshot
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13023openalex-snapshot
Interpersonal Reasoning: A Philosophical Psychology of Testimonial Trust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12243openalex-snapshot
Verbal Microaggressions as Hyper‐implicatures*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12499openalex-snapshot
Moral hinges and steadfastness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12451openalex-snapshot
Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12441openalex-snapshot
Epistemic akrasia: No apology required
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12456openalex-snapshot
What is rational belief?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12668openalex-snapshot
The relationship between belief and credence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12887openalex-snapshot
Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12896openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Partialism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12935openalex-snapshot
Morality of Belief II: Three Challenges and An Extension
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.70056openalex-snapshot
Impurist Epistemology and the Social Turn
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12137openalex-snapshot
Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12203openalex-snapshot
Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12225openalex-snapshot
On the independence of belief and credence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12269openalex-snapshot
Structural encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12124openalex-snapshot
Varieties of Moral Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12197openalex-snapshot
Disagreement and alienation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.70005openalex-snapshot
Moral‐Epistemic Dilemmas: The Case of Gender in Medical Diagnosis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12673openalex-snapshot
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12809openalex-snapshot
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12820openalex-snapshot
What Makes Something Surprising?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12840openalex-snapshot
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70109openalex-snapshot
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/rati.70008openalex-snapshot
The Epistemic Insignificance of Moral Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12355openalex-snapshot
Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12317openalex-snapshot
No Infelicity for the Infallibilist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1855openalex-snapshot
Acting on Probabilistic Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1857openalex-snapshot
Reply to MacFarlane and Greco
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20213470openalex-snapshot
Beyond Bad Beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/1470594x211052652openalex-snapshot
What should relational egalitarians believe?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.16995/pp.16337openalex-snapshot
Ideology as Relativized A Priori: On the Mind’s Relation to the Social World
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.16995/pp.17105openalex-snapshot
Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5274797openalex-snapshot
Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0017openalex-snapshot
Replies to Cepollaro and Torrengo, Táíwò, and Amoretti
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.3191openalex-snapshot
A Permissivist Alternative to Encroachment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7936/72g9-5g49openalex-snapshot
The Disunity of Perception
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.