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Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422openalex-snapshot
Optimal Retention in Agency Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_2openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0710-2openalex-snapshot
Advanced Fixed Point Theory for Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00124924openalex-snapshot
Incumbent performance and electoral control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01718440openalex-snapshot
The control of politicians: An economic model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4openalex-snapshot
Log-concave probability and its applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050082openalex-snapshot
Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90084-7openalex-snapshot
A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.008openalex-snapshot
Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.09.009openalex-snapshot
Fiscal restraints and voter welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625756openalex-snapshot
Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175104.003openalex-snapshot
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990232openalex-snapshot
The Case for Responsible Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608081024openalex-snapshot
Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewi015openalex-snapshot
Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12361openalex-snapshot
A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606openalex-snapshot
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150927openalex-snapshot
The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016037openalex-snapshot
Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057openalex-snapshot
Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2774041openalex-snapshot
Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297526openalex-snapshot
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2669237openalex-snapshot
Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4890669openalex-extracted
Mergers, Lobbying, and Elections: Is there a "Curse of Bigness"?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5137134openalex-extracted
Voter Information and Political Accountability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5143124openalex-extracted
Fiscal Accountability: Institutional Discipline and Behavioral Frictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-026-01720-5openalex-snapshot
Why Do People Protest? A Theory of Emotions, Public Policy, and Political Unrest
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102848openalex-snapshot
Political accountability with endogenous party formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.001openalex-snapshot
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.007openalex-snapshot
Accountability in Markovian elections
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102501openalex-snapshot
Direct or representative democracy? Co-Voting!
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/729952openalex-snapshot
Policy Making and Appointments under Electoral and Judicial Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac011openalex-snapshot
Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12787openalex-snapshot
The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12860openalex-snapshot
Political accountability under moral hazard
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211017236openalex-snapshot
Separation of powers with ideological parties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200186openalex-snapshot
Accountability and Grand Corruption
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200311openalex-snapshot
Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4801891openalex-snapshot
How do Electorally Vulnerable Politicians Allocate Effort? Evidence from Canada
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5404905openalex-snapshot
Fiscal Accountability: Institutional Discipline and Behavioral Frictions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5570574openalex-snapshot
Optimal Disclosure in Electoral Accountability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6955370openalex-snapshot
Information Revelation in Political Accountability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.70675/3d76003fzc0a0z486ez96e2z6c781a9ac129openalex-snapshot
Policymaking, Accountability, and Influence
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