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Antitrust compliance programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement: a reply to Wouter Wils

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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366209openalex-extracted
In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_2openalex-snapshot
Competition Law Compliance Programmes: A Law and Economics Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_9openalex-snapshot
Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective Antitrust Enforcement?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-019-09743-0openalex-snapshot
Antitrust Fines: Experiences from China
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185openalex-snapshot
The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.001openalex-snapshot
Preface and Acknowledgements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.002openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.003openalex-snapshot
Theoretical Foundations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.004openalex-snapshot
The Firm in Competition Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.005openalex-snapshot
The Single Entity Doctrine in Vertical Relationships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.006openalex-snapshot
The Single Entity Doctrine in Horizontal Relationships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.007openalex-snapshot
Conclusion of Part I
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.008openalex-snapshot
Corporate Governance Insights into Cartels
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.009openalex-snapshot
Cartel Enforcement: Sanctions and Leniency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.010openalex-snapshot
Cartel Enforcement: Corporate Compliance Programmes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.011openalex-snapshot
Conclusion of Part II
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.012openalex-snapshot
Conclusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.013openalex-snapshot
Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108505185.014openalex-snapshot
Index
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108759458.059openalex-snapshot
Antitrust Compliance: Collusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/err.2020.92openalex-snapshot
Towards Smarter Regulation in the Areas of Competition, Data Protection and Consumer Law: Why Greater Power Should Come with Greater Responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192855015.003.0013openalex-snapshot
13. Public Enforcement of Article 101 and Article 102 by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198824657.003.0013openalex-snapshot
13. Public Enforcement by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities of the Antitrust Provisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780199660322.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Public Enforcement by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities of the Antitrust Provisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/law-ocl/9780192855015.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Public Enforcement of Article 101 and Article 102 by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/law-ocl/9780198824657.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Public Enforcement by the Commission and the National Competition Authorities of the Antitrust Provisions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11606/d.2.2019.tde-20082020-160807openalex-snapshot
Programas de compliance à luz do ordenamento concorrencial brasileiro: instrumentos de conformidade para a política anticartel
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.12870/iar-12426openalex-snapshot
THE ITALIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITY’S MAIEUTIC ROLE
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5005778openalex-snapshot
Should Cartel Sanctions Be Reduced in Case the Offender Runs a Corporate Compliance Program?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2870/225311openalex-snapshot
Collective alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for the private enforcement of EU competition law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.32686/2542-0259-2018-4-54-62openalex-snapshot
Legal incentives for the introduction of antitrust compliance institutesby economic entities: the search for a balance of interests between the state and business
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.46941/2025.se1.3openalex-snapshot
Compliance in competition law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.60644/4495openalex-snapshot
Parental liability for competition law violations : lessons for emerging markets
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