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Online auction for IaaS clouds: Towards elastic user demands and weighted heterogeneous VMs

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/candar.2014.21openalex-snapshot
Truthful Allocation of Virtual Machine Instances with the Notion of Combinatorial Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/cloud.2014.30openalex-snapshot
Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/igcc.2014.7039165openalex-snapshot
Reducing the data center electricity costs through participation in smart grid programs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/infcom.2013.6566728openalex-snapshot
Profit-maximizing virtual machine trading in a federation of selfish clouds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/infcom.2013.6566946openalex-snapshot
A framework for truthful online auctions in cloud computing with heterogeneous user demands
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2014.6847931openalex-snapshot
Dynamic pricing and profit maximization for the cloud with geo-distributed data centers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/iwqos.2013.6550265openalex-snapshot
Revenue maximization with dynamic auctions in IaaS cloud markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tc.2015.2435784openalex-snapshot
A Framework for Truthful Online Auctions in Cloud Computing with Heterogeneous User Demands
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tcc.2013.9openalex-snapshot
A Combinatorial Auction-Based Mechanism for Dynamic VM Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2015.2435015openalex-snapshot
Virtual Machine Trading in a Federation of Clouds: Individual Profit and Social Welfare Maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1925019.1925031openalex-snapshot
VM power metering
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2745844.2745855openalex-snapshot
Online Auctions in IaaS Clouds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2796314.2745855openalex-snapshot
Online Auctions in IaaS Clouds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2843945openalex-snapshot
An Auction Mechanism for Cloud Spot Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2847220.2847228openalex-snapshot
Towards Designing a Truthful Online Auction Framework for Deadline-aware Cloud Resource Allocation

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3870246openalex-extracted
Online IAAS Cloud Auction Using Two Way Mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34515-0_20openalex-snapshot
A Taxonomy and Survey of Manifold Resource Allocation Techniques of IaaS in Cloud Computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35507-3_51openalex-snapshot
ILP-Based Approach for Cloud IaaS Composition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icccnt61001.2024.10725647openalex-snapshot
Comparative Analysis of Combinatorial Auction Mechanism and Fixed Price Mechanism in the Trading of Electronic Products in the Metaverse
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icdcs.2019.00013openalex-snapshot
An Online Mechanism for Purchasing IaaS Instances and Scheduling Pleasingly Parallel Jobs in Cloud Computing Environments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/infocom41043.2020.9155279openalex-snapshot
A Lightweight Auction Framework for Spectrum Allocation with Strong Security Guarantees
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/mass.2018.00023openalex-snapshot
A Dynamic Resource Overbooking Mechanism in Fog Computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/smartworld-uic-atc-scalcom-iop-sci.2019.00172openalex-snapshot
An Online Computation Offloading Mechanism for Mobile Edge Computing in Ultra-Dense Small Cell Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tcc.2022.3175610openalex-snapshot
Pricing Model for Dynamic Resource Overbooking in Edge Computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tnet.2019.2912077openalex-snapshot
A Market-Based Framework for Multi-Resource Allocation in Fog Computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tpds.2017.2781236openalex-snapshot
A Double Auction Mechanism to Bridge Users’ Task Requirements and Providers’ Resources in Two-Sided Cloud Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tpds.2018.2814566openalex-snapshot
Online Auction for IaaS Clouds: Towards Elastic User Demands and Weighted Heterogeneous VMs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tpds.2018.2884472openalex-snapshot
2018 Index IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems Vol. 29
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tsc.2019.2902549openalex-snapshot
Auction-Based VM Allocation for Deadline-Sensitive Tasks in Distributed Edge Cloud
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3447583openalex-snapshot
Uncertainty-aware Decisions in Cloud Computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.14288/1.0392655openalex-snapshot
Pricing and resource allocation in edge computing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.32628/cseit2172118openalex-snapshot
E-BIDDER (Bidding is now on your fingers)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1807.09756openalex-snapshot
A Market-Based Framework for Multi-Resource Allocation in Fog Computing
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