On the public citation graph

Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

0 signed · 131 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.394openalex-snapshot
Judgments of voluntary and physical causes in causal chains: probabilistic and social functionalist criteria for attributions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.623openalex-snapshot
Selecting explanations from causal chains: Do statistical principles explain preferences for voluntary causes?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5094-4openalex-snapshot
The Attribution of Blame
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-010-9200-zopenalex-snapshot
Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0010-7openalex-snapshot
From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.002openalex-snapshot
Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006openalex-snapshot
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.009openalex-snapshot
Judgments of cause and blame: The effects of intentionality and foreseeability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.04.003openalex-snapshot
Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.002openalex-snapshot
Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.004openalex-snapshot
The paradox of moral focus
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.07.009openalex-snapshot
It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002openalex-snapshot
Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.007openalex-snapshot
Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.03.002openalex-snapshot
Dirty work, clean hands: The moral psychology of indirect agency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498824openalex-snapshot
Living without Free Will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.126.4.556openalex-snapshot
Culpable control and the psychology of blame.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/10628-000openalex-snapshot
The psychology of interpersonal relations.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/11059-000openalex-snapshot
The Principles of Psychology
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/13091-000openalex-snapshot
The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/13091-005openalex-snapshot
Bringing character back: How the motivation to evaluate character influences judgments of moral blame.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253openalex-snapshot
New Waves in Philosophy of Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253_10openalex-snapshot
Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701408104openalex-snapshot
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0914826107openalex-snapshot
Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1416587112openalex-snapshot
Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0195126564.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Significance of Free Will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0195305043.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Free Will and Luck
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/019924989x.003.0004openalex-snapshot
17. Two Concepts of Liberty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198254744.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Causation in the Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Attributing Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570393.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Talking to Our Selves
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0019openalex-snapshot
Moral Judgment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12054openalex-snapshot
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12194openalex-snapshot
Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01421.xopenalex-snapshot
Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.xopenalex-snapshot
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00100.xopenalex-snapshot
A Proliferation of Liberties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.xopenalex-snapshot
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00527.xopenalex-snapshot
What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00609.xopenalex-snapshot
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12044openalex-snapshot
When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1192931openalex-snapshot
Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1753326.1753688openalex-snapshot
Are your participants gaming the system?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167289152003openalex-snapshot
Causal Primacy and Comparative Fault
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-115-1-1openalex-snapshot
Sensitive and Insensitive Causation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1192297openalex-snapshot
The Relation between Counterfactual ("But for") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors' Decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2023833openalex-snapshot
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2089062openalex-snapshot
The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2564653openalex-snapshot
The Significance of Free Will
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2678432openalex-snapshot
The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203963784openalex-snapshot
The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.35-3569openalex-snapshot
Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4907731openalex-extracted
You're Free When You Choose What I Like: Flexible Attributions of Free Choice Under Unconscious Manipulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781118661666.ch9openalex-snapshot
Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04272-yopenalex-snapshot
Mindfulness, Moral Reasoning and Responsibility: Towards Virtue in Ethical Decision-Making
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00458-xopenalex-snapshot
The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0754-8openalex-snapshot
Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0958-6openalex-snapshot
Stability, breadth and guidance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01882-7openalex-snapshot
Why the manipulation argument fails: determinism does not entail perfect prediction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02041-2openalex-snapshot
Mutual entailment between causation and responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02218-3openalex-snapshot
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1835-3openalex-snapshot
Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02848-0openalex-snapshot
A case for integrative epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9583-9openalex-snapshot
The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-024-09822-2openalex-snapshot
Does Free Will Really Exist? The Motivational Congruence Theory’s Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00498-2openalex-snapshot
Causation, Responsibility, and Typicality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105786openalex-snapshot
Revisiting causal pluralism: Intention, process, and dependency in cases of double prevention
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2026.104111openalex-snapshot
You’re free when you choose what i like: Flexible attributions of free choice under manipulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009219730openalex-snapshot
Moral Responsibility Reconsidered
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108580298.032openalex-snapshot
The Counterfactual Imagination: The Impact of Alternatives to Reality on Morality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108982511openalex-snapshot
Free Will
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000212openalex-snapshot
Wrong or merely prohibited: Special treatment of strict liability in intuitive moral judgment.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000428openalex-snapshot
Counterfactuals and the logic of causal selection.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00208825.2023.2207920openalex-snapshot
When do employees manipulate? Investigating the interplay of power value, political will, and hierarchy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190860974.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Mechanistic versus Functional Understanding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.002.0003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0002openalex-snapshot
The Stance of Moral Protest
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Defensive Harm and Measured Aggression
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Crime, Protection, and Compassion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Forgiveness as Renunciation of Moral Protest
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Love and Freedom
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846006.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Religion and Hope
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Causation with Human Face
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.002.0005openalex-snapshot
Dedication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0002openalex-snapshot
The Normative and the Descriptive
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Theories of Causation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Methods for Investigating Causal Cognition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Some Empirical Results Concerning Causal Learning and Representation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Invariance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Invariance Applied
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Experimental Results Concerning Invariance: Cheng, Lombrozo, and Others
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197585412.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Proportionality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Complex Tapestry of Free Will
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.002.0003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Dedication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.002.0006openalex-snapshot
Notes
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Compatibility and Significance Questions (Part I)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Compatibility and Significance Questions (Part II)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0004openalex-snapshot
The Intelligibility Question (Part I)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0005openalex-snapshot
The Intelligibility Question (Part II)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0006openalex-snapshot
The Libertarian Spectrum (Part I)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Libertarian Spectrum (Part II) Event-Causal Views, Centered and Non-centered
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0008openalex-snapshot
The Libertarian Spectrum (Part III) Agent-Causal and Noncausal Views
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0009openalex-snapshot
The Compatibilist Spectrum
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Skepticism and Illusionism about Free Will and Moral Responsibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197751404.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Ultimate Desert, the Dialectic of Selfhood, Kant’s Three Questions, Aspiration, Eastern Views, Theism, and Predestination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852407.003.0011openalex-snapshot
The Relevance of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190679309.013.38openalex-snapshot
Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871712.013.37openalex-snapshot
Mens Rea in Moral Judgment and Criminal Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/jcp-09-2020-0041openalex-snapshot
“He was brainwashed!” Criminal complicity and sentencing in France: interpreting a “crime committed under influence”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70110openalex-snapshot
Free will belief predicts everyday punitiveness across 44 countries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12605openalex-snapshot
Stable Causal Relationships Are Better Causal Relationships
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.70008openalex-snapshot
Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2: Manipulator‐focused responses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12537openalex-snapshot
Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70079openalex-snapshot
Can Soft‐Line Compatibilism Handle Eternally Recurrent Manipulation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/00258024251329180openalex-snapshot
Moral responsibility and mental disorder: A philosophical exploration of the insanity defence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/1088868317698288openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0018openalex-snapshot
The Problems of Divine Manipulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6719954/v1openalex-snapshot
Free WIll Belief Predicts Individual and Societal Punitiveness Across 44 Countries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/bz38eopenalex-snapshot
Direct and derivative moral responsibility: An overlooked distinction in experimental philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/db6msopenalex-snapshot
Changing Minds ― Epistemic Interventions in Causal Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/uxv7zopenalex-snapshot
No privileged link between intentionality and causation: Generalizable effects of agency in language
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069openalex-snapshot
Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781350188112.ch-008openalex-snapshot
Direct and Derivative Moral Responsibility: An Overlooked Distinction in Experimental Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5195/dpj.2020.347openalex-snapshot
Free Will and Heutagogy
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.