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The Analytic Truth and Falsity of Disjunctions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(70)90009-5openalex-snapshot
A theoretical analysis of insight into a reasoning task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.05.004openalex-snapshot
The negations of conjunctions, conditionals, and disjunctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.11.007openalex-snapshot
Temporal and spatial relations in sentential reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006openalex-snapshot
Logic, probability, and human reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:ling.0000023378.71748.dbopenalex-snapshot
Scalar Implicatures in Complex Sentences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.109.4.646openalex-snapshot
Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.85.1.1openalex-snapshot
On the relation between the natural logic of reasoning and standard logic.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.99.3.418openalex-snapshot
Propositional reasoning by model.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000146openalex-snapshot
On selecting evidence to test hypotheses: A theory of selection tasks.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000255openalex-snapshot
Modality, probability, and mental models.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/02724980042000309openalex-snapshot
Are Conjunctive Inferences Easier than Disjunctive Inferences? A Comparison of Rules and Models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780244000097openalex-snapshot
On imagining what is true (and what is false)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2013.838189openalex-snapshot
The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210903536902openalex-snapshot
The modulation of conditional assertions and its effects on reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1154079openalex-snapshot
The modulation of disjunctive assertions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12193openalex-snapshot
Naive Probability: Model‐Based Estimates of Unique Events
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12479openalex-snapshot
A Priori True and False Conditionals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00678.xopenalex-snapshot
The Disjunction Effect in Choice under Uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1993.tb00584.xopenalex-snapshot
How Diagrams Can Improve Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629openalex-snapshot
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5680.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Psychology of Proof
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25894-7_1openalex-snapshot
Neglect-Zero Effects in Dynamic Semantics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-020-01004-3openalex-snapshot
The relative difficulty of negations of conjunctions and disjunctions—a mental model perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09662-4openalex-snapshot
Models of Possibilities Instead of Logic as the Basis of Human Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106328openalex-snapshot
Naïve epistemics: A theory of rational and error-prone mental state reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2024.101677openalex-snapshot
Disjunction and access to knowledge: Educational implications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2310488120openalex-snapshot
Human verifications: Computable with truth values outside logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.2022532openalex-snapshot
What happened to the “new paradigm”? Commentary on Knauff and Gazzo Castañeda (2023)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1967963openalex-snapshot
The mental model theory of free choice permissions and paradoxical disjunctive inferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11590/abhps.2022.1.02openalex-snapshot
A Model-Based Method of Extension and Intension
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2021-0027openalex-snapshot
The Stoic Theory of Sign and the Semantic Modulation of Models
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2024.105.15openalex-snapshot
Progressive Confirmation of Two Mental Systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17846/pc.2022.8.1.20-31openalex-snapshot
Positions of Words and Logical Forms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v7i2.51801openalex-snapshot
The real interpretations of ‘if’ in academic texts: A study of the possibilities corresponding to the conditional in a psychology paper
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v8i3.61299openalex-snapshot
Pronouns, variables, and their positions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18309/anp.v1i51.1340openalex-snapshot
Logical Forms Depend on Semantic Models: the Illusory Disjunctive Sentences as Pieces of Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18309/anp.v51i1.1340openalex-snapshot
Logical Forms Depend on Semantic Models: the Illusory Disjunctive Sentences as Pieces of Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v15i34.629openalex-snapshot
Exclusive Disjunctions With Three Disjuncts from First-Order Predicate Calculus
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i53.11478openalex-snapshot
Aristotle and Boethius: Two Theses and Their Possibilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i57.13043openalex-snapshot
La posibilidad de las cláusulas en el condicional y la disyunción
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454openalex-snapshot
The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.36517/argumentos.23.1openalex-snapshot
Semantic ambiguity does not imply syntactic ambiguity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.36517/argumentos.23.9openalex-snapshot
A lucidez dos loucos: Nietzsche e outros
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4236/psych.2021.1212124openalex-snapshot
Reasoning with the THOG Problem: A Forty-Year Retrospective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5209/clac.77136openalex-snapshot
Jaina logic: a model-based analysis of the seven predications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5755/j01.sal.1.43.32821openalex-snapshot
Paradoxical inferences, biconditional interpretation, and exclusivity
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