On the public citation graph
Problems with Norms of Assertion
0 signed · 182 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00178004openalex-snapshot
On empirically equivalent systems of the world
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-007-9019-5openalex-snapshot
The status of the knowledge account of assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9214-4openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Moore, and Bayes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9542-zopenalex-snapshot
Assertion, knowledge, and action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0112-zopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0329-6openalex-snapshot
Assertion and relative truth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005162503125openalex-snapshot
Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020254327114openalex-snapshot
Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248588_7openalex-snapshot
Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0198236212.003.0002openalex-snapshot
What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0199288038.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Practical Interests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Against Assertion*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0004openalex-snapshot
What Is Assertion*?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Information and Assertoric Force*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Truth‐Relativism, Norm‐Relativism, and Assertion*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Norms of Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Assertion and Isolated Second‐Hand Knowledge*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0012openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Norms, and Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr085openalex-snapshot
Two more for the knowledge account of assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr123openalex-snapshot
Assertion, knowledge and predictions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr124openalex-snapshot
Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.12013openalex-snapshot
Assertion and The Provision of Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.xopenalex-snapshot
CONTEXTUALISM AND WARRANTED ASSERTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1970.tb00042.xopenalex-snapshot
CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00134.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE IN THE IMAGE OF ASSERTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00136.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00138.xopenalex-snapshot
APPLYING PRAGMATICS TO EPISTEMOLOGY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01202.xopenalex-snapshot
Reasons to Believe and Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00136.xopenalex-snapshot
Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00268.xopenalex-snapshot
Assertion and its Constitutive Norms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.xopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12045openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1969660openalex-snapshot
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000843openalex-snapshot
IN WHAT SENSE IS KNOWLEDGE THE NORM OF ASSERTION?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-2-167openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-010openalex-snapshot
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-026openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.187763openalex-snapshot
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4740892openalex-extracted
The Truth About Assertion and Retraction: a Review of the Empirical Literature
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22528-4_8openalex-snapshot
Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00451-4openalex-snapshot
Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01713-1openalex-snapshot
Lying: Knowledge or belief?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5openalex-snapshot
The C account of assertion: a negative result
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1openalex-snapshot
Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104657openalex-snapshot
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2021.07.015openalex-snapshot
Post-truth assertion and assertoric competence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2021.09.005openalex-snapshot
Predicating Truth: An empirically based analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818openalex-snapshot
Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.009openalex-snapshot
FFAA and the Duty to Believe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.012openalex-snapshot
KRA and Epistemic Contextualism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.014openalex-snapshot
JRA and Knowledge-First Justification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118openalex-snapshot
The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.003openalex-snapshot
Philosophy as Rational Systematization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.004openalex-snapshot
Sense-making From a Human Point of View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.007openalex-snapshot
What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.008openalex-snapshot
Armchair Metaphysics Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.010openalex-snapshot
What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.012openalex-snapshot
Collingwood’s Idealist Metaontology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.013openalex-snapshot
Pragmatism and the Limits of Metaphilosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.014openalex-snapshot
On Metaphysical Quietism and Everyday Life
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.015openalex-snapshot
The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic–Continental Divide
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.016openalex-snapshot
Phenomenological Method and the Achievement of Recognition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.017openalex-snapshot
Existentialist Methodology and Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.018openalex-snapshot
Hermeneutics and the Question of Method
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.019openalex-snapshot
Critical Theory’s Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316344118.020openalex-snapshot
An Extension of Deconstructionist Methodology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.48openalex-snapshot
A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.28openalex-snapshot
Truth: The Rule or the Aim of Assertion?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819120000169openalex-snapshot
There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024openalex-snapshot
A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667868openalex-snapshot
The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2024.2434874openalex-snapshot
Chatting with bots: AI, speech acts, and the edge of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285013openalex-snapshot
The distinctive “should” of assertability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw043openalex-snapshot
Assertion: on the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric SpeechBy Sanford G. Goldberg
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any008openalex-snapshot
Truth and assertion: rules versus aims
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.3openalex-snapshot
Commitment Accounts of Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Oxford Handbook of Lying
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.002.0007openalex-snapshot
List of figures and tables
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.10openalex-snapshot
Lying, Sincerity, and Quality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.11openalex-snapshot
Lying and Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.12openalex-snapshot
Lying and Certainty
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.13openalex-snapshot
Lying and Omissions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.14openalex-snapshot
Lying, Implicating, and Presupposing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.15openalex-snapshot
Lying and Self-Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.16openalex-snapshot
Lying, Testimony, and Epistemic Vigilance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.17openalex-snapshot
Knowledge Lies and Group Lies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.18openalex-snapshot
Selfless Assertions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.19openalex-snapshot
Bald-Faced Lies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.2openalex-snapshot
Classic Philosophical Approaches to Lying and Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.22openalex-snapshot
White and Prosocial Lies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.23openalex-snapshot
Lying and Fiction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.24openalex-snapshot
Lying and Quotation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.25openalex-snapshot
Lying and Humour
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.26openalex-snapshot
Lying, Irony, and Default Interpretation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.27openalex-snapshot
Lying and Vagueness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.28openalex-snapshot
Lying, Metaphor, and Hyperbole
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.29openalex-snapshot
Lying and Politeness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.3openalex-snapshot
Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Lying
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.30openalex-snapshot
Development of Lying and Cognitive Abilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.31openalex-snapshot
Lying and Lie Detection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.32openalex-snapshot
Lying and Computational Linguistics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.33openalex-snapshot
Lying in Social Psychology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.34openalex-snapshot
Lying and Psychology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.35openalex-snapshot
Lying and Neuroscience
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.36openalex-snapshot
Lying and Ethics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.38openalex-snapshot
Lying and the Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.39openalex-snapshot
Lying in Economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.4openalex-snapshot
Linguistic Approaches to Lying and Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.40openalex-snapshot
Lying and Education
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.41openalex-snapshot
Lying and Discourse Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.42openalex-snapshot
Lying and Deception in Politics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.43openalex-snapshot
Lying and History
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.44openalex-snapshot
Lying and the Arts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.45openalex-snapshot
Lying in Different Cultures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.5openalex-snapshot
Psycholinguistic Approaches to Lying and Deception
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.6openalex-snapshot
Lying, Deception, and the Brain
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.8openalex-snapshot
Lying and Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.9openalex-snapshot
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12425openalex-snapshot
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12515openalex-snapshot
Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12525openalex-snapshot
Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12210openalex-snapshot
A non‐normative account of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0083openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/k3ndcopenalex-snapshot
The Distinctive "Should" of Assertability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3765/sp.13.4openalex-snapshot
Evidential meaning and (not-)at-issueness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4396/322openalex-snapshot
Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.