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Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12222
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5_1openalex-snapshot
What is Justified Belief?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00372404openalex-snapshot
Evidentialism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00398599openalex-snapshot
Assertion and belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9590-9openalex-snapshot
Very Improbable Knowing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9255-8openalex-snapshot
Dubious assertions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9542-zopenalex-snapshot
Assertion, knowledge, and action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0112-zopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9655-0openalex-snapshot
Warrant and action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024961917413openalex-snapshot
What Good are Counterexamples?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00048401003660333openalex-snapshot
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.587438openalex-snapshot
Two Ways to Put Knowledge First
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775010openalex-snapshot
Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775012openalex-snapshot
Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2013.775016openalex-snapshot
Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/289610openalex-snapshot
Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/019925656x.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and its Limits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269556.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001openalex-snapshot
A Virtue Epistemology
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Improbable Knowing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Can there be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121openalex-snapshot
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq027openalex-snapshot
Prompting challenges
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00506.xopenalex-snapshot
Stick To What You Know
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00107.xopenalex-snapshot
‘But That's Not Evidence; It's Not Even True!’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.xopenalex-snapshot
Norms of Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00677.xopenalex-snapshot
Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00724.xopenalex-snapshot
Treating Something as a Reason for Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.xopenalex-snapshot
What Else Justification Could Be1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00787.xopenalex-snapshot
The Normative Role of Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00866.xopenalex-snapshot
Some Thoughts on the JK‐Rule1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00196.xopenalex-snapshot
ACTING ON KNOWLEDGE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00136.xopenalex-snapshot
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00139.xopenalex-snapshot
THE KNOWLEDGE NORM FOR ASSERTION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00200.xopenalex-snapshot
THERE IT IS*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01270.xopenalex-snapshot
What do we Aim At When we Believe?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.xopenalex-snapshot
Justified Judging
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.xopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Assertion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.xopenalex-snapshot
Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00605.xopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-67openalex-snapshot
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-2-227openalex-snapshot
Must We Know What We Say?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1728705openalex-snapshot
Epistemology Formalized
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2025679openalex-snapshot
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2183766openalex-snapshot
Functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2184366openalex-snapshot
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2185175openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Possibilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2219870openalex-snapshot
White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051022openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7224.001.0001openalex-snapshot
White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4740892openalex-extracted
The Truth About Assertion and Retraction: a Review of the Empirical Literature
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22528-4_8openalex-snapshot
Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04632-1_33openalex-snapshot
Epistemische Normen des Behauptens, des Glaubens und des praktischen Begründens
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-025-01016-5openalex-snapshot
What Good Are Knowledge Norms?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-022-09591-0openalex-snapshot
Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03030-wopenalex-snapshot
The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03362-7openalex-snapshot
The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03438-4openalex-snapshot
P, but you don’t know that P
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03668-0openalex-snapshot
Knowledge and decision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03745-4openalex-snapshot
Two accounts of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04628-6openalex-snapshot
How to act on what you know
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00078-yopenalex-snapshot
Knowledge and acceptance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104657openalex-snapshot
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1426024openalex-snapshot
A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Range of Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.002.0003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Reasons and Their Roles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Justifying and Demanding
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0004openalex-snapshot
A Modal Theory of Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Possessing Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Subjective Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Rational Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Conclusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70060openalex-snapshot
A Natural Argument for Contextualism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15580/gjss.2024.2.102524154openalex-snapshot
The Philosophical Proofs of the Existence of God: It’s Implication for Christian Faith and Practice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.018openalex-snapshot
Unifying Group Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0007.003openalex-snapshot
Epistemic Worth
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