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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-50701-9_16openalex-snapshot
General theory of cumulative inference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_5openalex-snapshot
Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82453-1_15openalex-snapshot
Theoretical Foundations for Non-Monotonic Reasoning in Expert Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3390-9_8openalex-snapshot
Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_2openalex-snapshot
Nonmonotonic Foundations for Deontic Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048352openalex-snapshot
Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01531262openalex-snapshot
Deontic logic as founded on nonmonotonic logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018421openalex-snapshot
Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9296-0openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9351-0openalex-snapshot
Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0182-yopenalex-snapshot
Belief, credence, and norms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0018-2openalex-snapshot
When warrant transmits and when it doesn’t: towards a general framework
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0209-5openalex-snapshot
Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0230-yopenalex-snapshot
Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(80)90014-4openalex-snapshot
A logic for default reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(90)90057-7openalex-snapshot
A skeptical theory of inheritance in nonmonotonic semantic networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(90)90101-5openalex-snapshot
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(91)90099-6openalex-snapshot
Cumulative default logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2013.06.015openalex-snapshot
Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1874-5857(09)70548-5openalex-snapshot
Handbook of the History of Logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968openalex-snapshot
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020310000237openalex-snapshot
DEGREE SUPERVALUATIONAL LOGIC
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026560718525openalex-snapshot
The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.630010openalex-snapshot
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.003.0011openalex-snapshot
When Warrant Transmits
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/8.2.119openalex-snapshot
General patterns for nonmonotonic reasoning: from basic entailments to plausible relations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/7.5.605openalex-snapshot
Beyond rational monotony: some strong non-horn rules for nonmonotonic inference relations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu085openalex-snapshot
Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198503064.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Change, Choice and Inference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198537472.003.0002openalex-snapshot
General Patterns in Nonmonotonic Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.xopenalex-snapshot
I—Crispin Wright: Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00475.xopenalex-snapshot
Wright on the transmission of support: a Bayesian analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00676.xopenalex-snapshot
Reason and the Grain of Belief *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00714.xopenalex-snapshot
Normative Conflicts and The Logic of ‘Ought’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1979.tb01788.xopenalex-snapshot
TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00068.xopenalex-snapshot
Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00188.xopenalex-snapshot
BOOTSTRAPPING, DEFEASIBLE REASONING, AND A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.xopenalex-snapshot
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00448.xopenalex-snapshot
Bootstrapping in General*†
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.xopenalex-snapshot
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12099openalex-snapshot
Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3233/fi-1994-21121openalex-snapshot
WHAT IS A NONMONOTONIC CONSEQUENCE RELATION?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.007openalex-snapshot
Bootstrapping, Dogmatism, and the Structure of Epistemic Justification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2008105414openalex-snapshot
Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88708-7_21openalex-snapshot
Representation Results for Non-cumulative Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-8566-0_10openalex-snapshot
Strict Truth, Tolerant Truth, and Generalized Strict-Tolerant Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05275-1openalex-snapshot
An inferentialist approach to Mates’s Puzzle
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103966openalex-snapshot
A postulate-driven study of logical argumentation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810322.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Getting Things Right
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810322.003.0006openalex-snapshot
The Explanatory Role of Reasons I
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810322.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Explanatory Role of Reasons II
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810322.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Reasons for Belief, Action, and Emotions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.007openalex-snapshot
Bootstrapping, Dogmatism, and the Structure of Epistemic Justification
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