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The Social Sense: Susceptibility to Others’ Beliefs in Human Infants and Adults

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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8openalex-snapshot
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(92)90004-2openalex-snapshot
A theory of the child's theory of mind
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Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2005.08.041openalex-snapshot
Theory of mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.001openalex-snapshot
Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00096-2openalex-snapshot
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0285(02)00005-1openalex-snapshot
Developments in young infants' reasoning about occluded objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00076512openalex-snapshot
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2003.0067openalex-snapshot
Representing occluded objects in the human infant brain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00308openalex-snapshot
Minds, Modules, and Meta-Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00742.xopenalex-snapshot
Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01943.xopenalex-snapshot
Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.xopenalex-snapshot
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1107621openalex-snapshot
Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1146282openalex-snapshot
Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03196706openalex-snapshot
Likelihood ratios: A simple and flexible statistic for empirical psychologists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6988.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Understanding the Representational Mind

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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Preverbal infants identify emotional reactions that are incongruent with goal outcomes
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The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs
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“Making it explicit” makes a difference: Evidence for a dissociation of spontaneous and intentional level 1 perspective taking in high-functioning autism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.016openalex-snapshot
Task instructions and implicit theory of mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.017openalex-snapshot
Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.016openalex-snapshot
Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: Are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.036openalex-snapshot
18-month-olds comprehend indirect communicative acts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.001openalex-snapshot
From self to social cognition: Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.010openalex-snapshot
Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.03.011openalex-snapshot
Me and we: Metacognition and performance evaluation of joint actions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.006openalex-snapshot
Mental files and belief: A cognitive theory of how children represent belief and its intensionality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.11.002openalex-snapshot
Perceiving referential intent: Dynamics of reference in natural parent–child interactions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.010openalex-snapshot
Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.014openalex-snapshot
I’ve got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.004openalex-snapshot
Anxiety impairs spontaneous perspective calculation: Evidence from a level-1 visual perspective-taking task
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.023openalex-snapshot
Early conversational environment enables spontaneous belief attribution in deaf children
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.021openalex-snapshot
Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.11.005openalex-snapshot
Surprise! 20-month-old infants understand the emotional consequences of false beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.11.010openalex-snapshot
Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.004openalex-snapshot
Reaction time profiles of adults’ action prediction reveal two mindreading systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.018openalex-snapshot
Current evidence for automatic Theory of Mind processing in adults
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012openalex-snapshot
Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.008openalex-snapshot
Comparison within pairs promotes analogical abstraction in three-month-olds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.017openalex-snapshot
The relationship between parental mental-state language and 2.5-year-olds’ performance on a nontraditional false-belief task
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.012openalex-snapshot
Do non-human primates really represent others’ ignorance? A test of the awareness relations hypothesis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.016openalex-snapshot
Pupils say more than a thousand words: Pupil size reflects how observed actions are interpreted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104017openalex-snapshot
Level 2 perspective-taking distinguishes automatic and non-automatic belief-tracking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104241openalex-snapshot
Perspective taking as virtual navigation? Perceptual simulation of what others see reflects their location in space but not their gaze
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104451openalex-snapshot
Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104480openalex-snapshot
Attention in naïve psychology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104640openalex-snapshot
Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104658openalex-snapshot
How do non-human primates represent others' awareness of where objects are hidden?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105531openalex-snapshot
More than one path to pragmatics? Insights from children's grasp of implicit, figurative and ironical meaning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105760openalex-snapshot
Do toddlers reason about other people's experiences of objects? A limit to early mental state reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105812openalex-snapshot
Flexible social monitoring as revealed by eye movements: Spontaneous mental state updating triggered by others’ unexpected actions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106055openalex-snapshot
Evidence that altercentric biases in a continuous false belief task depend on highlighting the agent's belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106074openalex-snapshot
Altercentric bias in preverbal infants' encoding of object kind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106328openalex-snapshot
Naïve epistemics: A theory of rational and error-prone mental state reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106645openalex-snapshot
Does communication-based belief attribution in 18-month-olds reflect an altercentric bias?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.08.003openalex-snapshot
Infants understand deceptive intentions to implant false beliefs about identity: New evidence for early mentalistic reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.01.005openalex-snapshot
Infants’ representations of same and different in match- and non-match-to-sample
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.05.003openalex-snapshot
Theories, structures and simulations in the research of early mentalizing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2014.07.018openalex-snapshot
A model for Social Communication And Language Evolution and Development (SCALED)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.02.005openalex-snapshot
How from action-mirroring to intention-ascription?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.009openalex-snapshot
The pull of the group: Conscious conflict and the involuntary tendency towards conformity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.12.001openalex-snapshot
Perceiving a story outside of conscious awareness: When we infer narrative attributes from subliminal sequential stimuli
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.001openalex-snapshot
Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.020openalex-snapshot
Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhood
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2023.103625openalex-snapshot
Principles of belief acquisition. How we read other minds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.04.012openalex-snapshot
Influence from representations of others’ responses: social priming meets social influence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2015.05.027openalex-snapshot
Neural correlates of observing joint actions with shared intentions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2020.01.016openalex-snapshot
The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.11.001openalex-snapshot
Reputation Management: In Autism, Generosity Is Its Own Reward
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.11.020openalex-snapshot
Plant Evolution: Pulses of Extinction and Speciation in Gymnosperm Diversity
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