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Knapsack auctions

https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109677
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1544580openalex-extracted
Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2284915openalex-extracted
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Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_20openalex-snapshot
On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45771-6_21openalex-snapshot
Packing Under Convex Quadratic Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07024-1_9openalex-snapshot
Robust Double Auctions for Resource Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03780-6_11openalex-snapshot
Prompt Mechanism for Online Auctions with Multi-unit Demands
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_7openalex-snapshot
Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27openalex-snapshot
Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_2openalex-snapshot
A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_41openalex-snapshot
A Quasi-PTAS for Profit-Maximizing Pricing on Line Graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_16openalex-snapshot
Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03685-9_5openalex-snapshot
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_25openalex-snapshot
On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12200-2_48openalex-snapshot
The Power of Fair Pricing Mechanisms
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Approximation Algorithms for Non-single-minded Profit-Maximization Problems with Limited Supply
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_4openalex-snapshot
Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_46openalex-snapshot
A QPTAS for -Envy-Free Profit-Maximizing Pricing on Line Graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-92-2014-4_18openalex-snapshot
Learn to Bid: Near-Optimal Knapsack Bidding Under Budget and CPA Constraints with Sparse Delayed Feedback
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-4839-2_5openalex-snapshot
Strategies for Non-myopic Users in EIP-1559
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-011-1057-2openalex-snapshot
Strategies in competing subset selection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-014-9754-9openalex-snapshot
Prompt mechanism for online auctions with multi-unit demands
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10922-015-9355-7openalex-snapshot
An Agent-Based Economy Model of Real-Time Secondary Market for the Cognitive Radio Networks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.11.011openalex-snapshot
Competitive subset selection with two agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.08.047openalex-snapshot
The Subset Sum game
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.031openalex-snapshot
Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.02.003openalex-snapshot
Competitive auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2007.08.002openalex-snapshot
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.07.028openalex-snapshot
On the complexity of the highway problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202341003017openalex-snapshot
Application network programming method – knapsack problem and it’s modification
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/15536548.2016.1139425openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design for Data Replica Placement (DRP) problem in strategic settings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/cloud53861.2021.00057openalex-snapshot
A Mechanism Design and Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization on Cloud Dynamic Spot Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/ecrts.2012.25openalex-snapshot
Real-Time Competitive Environments: Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2008.15openalex-snapshot
Approximation Algorithms for Single-minded Envy-free Profit-maximization Problems with Limited Supply
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2010.76openalex-snapshot
Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows and Cuts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icde.2009.88openalex-snapshot
Shared Winner Determination in Sponsored Search Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/icemms.2010.5563477openalex-snapshot
Sponsored search theory: How is it going?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2018.8485980openalex-snapshot
Online Knapsack Problem Under Expected Capacity Constraint
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2009.2021975openalex-snapshot
An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tc.2013.86openalex-snapshot
Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks in Competitive Real-Time Environments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3456762openalex-snapshot
A QPTAS for ɛ-Envy-Free Profit-Maximizing Pricing on Line Graphs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2013.1187openalex-snapshot
Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multislot Sponsored Search Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te1239openalex-snapshot
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
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