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Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets

https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602893
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2394319openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2939084openalex-extracted
Search, Matching, and the Role of Digital Marketplace Design in Enabling Trade: Evidence from Airbnb
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965135openalex-extracted
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3004814openalex-extracted
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agents' Actions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3155526openalex-extracted
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320080openalex-extracted
A Simulation Approach to Designing Digital Matching Platforms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3864227openalex-extracted
To Interfere or Not To Interfere: Information Revelation and Price-Setting Incentives in a Multiagent Learning Environment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4034950openalex-extracted
Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices
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When A Platform Competes with Third-Party Sellers in Networked Markets: A Revenue Management Perspective
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Ride Sharing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_16openalex-snapshot
Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_22openalex-snapshot
Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2019.12.190openalex-snapshot
A Game-Theoretic Model for Product Placement in Online Platform Markets
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Large-scale nationwide ridesharing system: A case study of Chunyun
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2019.01.021openalex-snapshot
Service and Capacity Planning in Crowd-Sourced Delivery
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tnse.2018.2877578openalex-snapshot
Incentive Design in Peer Review: Rating and Repeated Endogenous Matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/tse.2018.2842188openalex-snapshot
Incentivizing Deep Fixes in Software Economies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602887openalex-snapshot
Dynamic matching market design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764533openalex-snapshot
Short Lists in Centralized Clearinghouses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/2872427.2883011openalex-snapshot
Mean Field Equilibria for Competitive Exploration in Resource Sharing Settings
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3369925openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3116openalex-snapshot
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265openalex-snapshot
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3794openalex-snapshot
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0853openalex-snapshot
Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/54openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Behavior in Competing Dynamic Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g14010002openalex-snapshot
Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/reco.695.0683openalex-snapshot
Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260742openalex-snapshot
Competing Dynamic Matching Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1602.02439openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1907.04485openalex-snapshot
Assortment planning for two-sided sequential matching markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2009.11867openalex-snapshot
The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2012.07348openalex-snapshot
Bandit Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets
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