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Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085130
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1037openalex-snapshot
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466731openalex-snapshot
Durability and Monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2011.76openalex-snapshot
Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00188openalex-snapshot
Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1110.0691openalex-snapshot
Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297403openalex-snapshot
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1106.0961openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/2722129.2722196openalex-snapshot
Perfect bayesian equilibria in repeated sales

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2444495openalex-extracted
Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088600openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808228openalex-extracted
Data Tracking under Competition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67661-2_25openalex-snapshot
Low-Regret Algorithms for Strategic Buyers with Unknown Valuations in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.001openalex-snapshot
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1109/focs46700.2020.00033openalex-snapshot
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219183openalex-snapshot
The Price of Prior Dependence in Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219233openalex-snapshot
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3331033.3331035openalex-snapshot
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399495openalex-snapshot
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3485447.3512059openalex-snapshot
Nash Convergence of Mean-Based Learning Algorithms in First Price Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765087openalex-snapshot
Breaking Omertà: On Threshold Cryptography, Smart Collusion, and Whistleblowing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3736252.3742652openalex-snapshot
Truthful, Credible, and Optimal Auctions for Matroids via Blockchains and Commitments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4542openalex-snapshot
Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts: Guaranteed Allocation and Price with Programmatic Efficiency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i6.20600openalex-snapshot
First-Order Convex Fitting and Its Application to Economics and Optimization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1804.11060openalex-snapshot
Learning Optimal Reserve Price against Non-myopic Bidders
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1806.02661openalex-snapshot
New mechanism for repeated posted price auction with a strategic buyer without discounting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1906.03286openalex-snapshot
Dynamic First Price Auctions Robust to Heterogeneous Buyers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.05519openalex-snapshot
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling
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