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Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods

https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467570
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4openalex-snapshot
Robust Multidimensional Pricing: Separation Without Regret
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90135-4openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007openalex-snapshot
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.007openalex-snapshot
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.018openalex-snapshot
Robust monopoly pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005openalex-snapshot
Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.001openalex-snapshot
Robust incentives for information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105403openalex-snapshot
Correlation-robust auction design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011openalex-snapshot
On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137024381_3openalex-snapshot
A Min-Max Solution of an Inventory Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110openalex-snapshot
On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/717350openalex-snapshot
Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad100openalex-snapshot
Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2014.11openalex-snapshot
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00082openalex-snapshot
Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075.49openalex-snapshot
Pricing Randomized Allocations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814374590_0012openalex-snapshot
Pricing Without Priors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482593openalex-snapshot
Mechanism design via optimal transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482544openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3369927openalex-snapshot
The Better Half of Selling Separately
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177730030openalex-snapshot
Statistical Decision Functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131159openalex-snapshot
Robustness and Linear Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160145openalex-snapshot
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180773openalex-snapshot
Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3219openalex-snapshot
Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520411586-009openalex-snapshot
Comparison of Experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2886456openalex-snapshot
Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488222openalex-snapshot
Robust Reserve Pricing in Auctions Under Mean Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171openalex-snapshot
On general minimax theorems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275405openalex-snapshot
Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1664openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885625openalex-snapshot
Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1886045openalex-snapshot
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171924openalex-snapshot
Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2999574openalex-snapshot
Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12618openalex-snapshot
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14165openalex-snapshot
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14993openalex-snapshot
Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1517openalex-snapshot
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1204.1846openalex-snapshot
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1910.04260openalex-snapshot
Robust Monopoly Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/1873601.1873650openalex-snapshot
Pricing randomized allocations

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4090071openalex-extracted
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4729093openalex-extracted
Matching Workers in Organizations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_31openalex-snapshot
Separation in Distributionally Robust Monopolist Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663721openalex-snapshot
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915700openalex-snapshot
Costly Multidimensional Screening
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4731184openalex-snapshot
Robust Optimal Selling Mechanism under Non-linear Utility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5378197openalex-snapshot
Tractable Robust Mechanism Design with General Concave Objectives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta20240openalex-snapshot
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2109.00487openalex-snapshot
Costly Multidimensional Screening
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