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A Model of Expertise
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1001openalex-snapshot
Game-Theoretic Models of Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1029openalex-snapshot
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1066openalex-snapshot
The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2318openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-bopenalex-snapshot
Refining cheap-talk equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90002-xopenalex-snapshot
Games and economic behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007openalex-snapshot
A two-person game of information transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401002192openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/(issn)1540-5907openalex-snapshot
American Journal of Political Science
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/(issn)1756-2171openalex-snapshot
The RAND Journal of Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.144848openalex-snapshot
An Analysis of Stock Recommendations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555625openalex-snapshot
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003549741-8openalex-snapshot
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
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