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Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints

https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160124

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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College admissions with affirmative action

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6openalex-snapshot

Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1openalex-snapshot

The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90129-ropenalex-snapshot

Comparative statics in matching markets

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.02.002openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.003openalex-snapshot

School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jda.2006.03.006openalex-snapshot

Two algorithms for the Student-Project Allocation problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004openalex-snapshot

School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2010.05.005openalex-snapshot

The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301openalex-snapshot

Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00335openalex-snapshot

The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/362619.362631openalex-snapshot

The stable marriage problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466openalex-snapshot

Matching with Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot

The New York City High School Match

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20101552openalex-snapshot

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954openalex-snapshot

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.24.1.95openalex-snapshot

M-Convex Function on Generalized Polymatroid

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot

The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10570openalex-snapshot

Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1135openalex-snapshot

Effective affirmative action in school choice

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Widening Access in University Admissions

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Market Design

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Student-Project-Resource Allocation: Complexity of the Symmetric Case

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New Directions of Study in Matching with Constraints

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Refugee Allocation in the Setting of Hedonic Games

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Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information

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Multi-stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: Strategyproof Mechanism for Handling General Hereditary Constraints

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Market Design

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On the Influence of Social Robots During Ethical-Decision Making: A Preliminary Study

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Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

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Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for ratio constraints

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Multi-stage generalized deferred acceptance mechanism: Strategyproof mechanism for handling general hereditary constraints

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System representation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103825openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof Allocation Mechanisms with Endowments and M-convex Distributional Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103855openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof Mechanism for Two-Sided Matching with Resource Allocation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110675openalex-snapshot

Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.08.033openalex-snapshot

College admissions with ties and common quotas: Integer programming approach

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2025.06.013openalex-snapshot

On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.010openalex-snapshot

Matching through institutions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.013openalex-snapshot

Efficient matching under general constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006openalex-snapshot

Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.008openalex-snapshot

Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.004openalex-snapshot

Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis

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Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement

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Dynamic reserves in matching markets

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441openalex-snapshot

Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2025.105973openalex-snapshot

Widening access in university admissions

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Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad032openalex-snapshot

Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12482openalex-snapshot

Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints

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Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in India and Beyond

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Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190780openalex-snapshot

Job Matching under Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289965openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for union of symmetric m-convex constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.15807/torsj.60.50openalex-snapshot

THE STUDENTS/DEPARTMENTS ALLOCATION PROBLEM WITH GROUP CONSTRAINTS — AN APPLICATION OF DISCRETE CONVEX ANALYSIS

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Matching Market Design with Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2743000openalex-snapshot

Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3215670openalex-snapshot

Large Matchings in Large Markets with Flexible Supply

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562665openalex-snapshot

Priorities vs. Quotas

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3582669openalex-snapshot

Designing Direct Matching Mechanisms for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4158066openalex-snapshot

Diversity, Intersectionality and (Gross) Substitutes

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309391openalex-snapshot

Widening Access in University Admissions

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5214817openalex-snapshot

Efficient Major Transition Exchange under Distributional and Dual Priority-respecting Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5350365openalex-snapshot

Adaptive Priority Mechanisms

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5369037openalex-snapshot

The Theory of Matching with Contracts

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22541/au.167226827.72669249/v1openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.005openalex-snapshot

Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/82openalex-snapshot

Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/58openalex-snapshot

New Algorithms for Japanese Residency Matching

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/27openalex-snapshot

Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1808.08813openalex-snapshot

The Complexity of Student-Project-Resource Matching-Allocation Problems

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2012.03659openalex-snapshot

Non-portability of Algorithmic Fairness in India

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/iyfl3561openalex-snapshot

Efficient Allocation Mechanism with Endowments and Distributional Constraints

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Stability and Pareto Optimality in Refugee Allocation Matchings

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Game Theoretic Analysis for Two-Sided Matching with Resource Allocation

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