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On logics without contraction

https://doi.org/10.14264/366356
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.166openalex-snapshot
Contraction and closure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12821-9_14openalex-snapshot
Can a Quantum Computer Run the von Neumann Architecture?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21963-8_18openalex-snapshot
Kurt Gödel and the Consistency of R##
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_11openalex-snapshot
A Paraconsistent and Substructural Conditional Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_17openalex-snapshot
Notes on Inconsistent Set Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9309-0_3openalex-snapshot
Negation in Relevant Logics (How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Routley Star)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_22openalex-snapshot
Validity and Truth-Preservation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413865openalex-snapshot
Relevant logic and the theory of information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9024-5openalex-snapshot
Stability and Paradox in Algorithmic Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9239-1openalex-snapshot
Naive Modus Ponens
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09500-4openalex-snapshot
Burali-Forti as a Purely Logical Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0666-7openalex-snapshot
Conditionals and Curry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-016-9665-0openalex-snapshot
The Lambek Calculus Extended with Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1199-5openalex-snapshot
Capturing naive validity in the Cut-free approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1230-xopenalex-snapshot
The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02507-zopenalex-snapshot
Non-Boolean classical relevant logics I
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9235-xopenalex-snapshot
Naive Structure, Contraction and Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00064-2openalex-snapshot
Let's plan it deductively!
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.001openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.002openalex-snapshot
What Are the Paradoxes?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.003openalex-snapshot
Introduction to an Inconsistent World3
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.004openalex-snapshot
Paradoxes; or, “Here in the Presence of an Absurdity”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.005openalex-snapshot
How to Face the Paradoxes?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.006openalex-snapshot
In Search of a Uniform Solution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.007openalex-snapshot
Metatheory and Naive Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.008openalex-snapshot
Prolegomena to Any Future Inconsistent Mathematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.009openalex-snapshot
Where Are the Paradoxes?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.010openalex-snapshot
Set Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.011openalex-snapshot
Arithmetic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.012openalex-snapshot
Algebra
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.013openalex-snapshot
Real Analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.014openalex-snapshot
Topology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.015openalex-snapshot
Why Are There Paradoxes?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.016openalex-snapshot
Ordinary Paradox
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.017openalex-snapshot
Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.018openalex-snapshot
Index
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108993135.019openalex-snapshot
Backmatter
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020312000019openalex-snapshot
TRANSFINITE CARDINALS IN PARACONSISTENT SET THEORY
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000409openalex-snapshot
CONTRACTIONS OF NONCONTRACTIVE CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000501openalex-snapshot
NAIVE SET THEORY AND NONTRANSITIVE LOGIC
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1025648722188openalex-snapshot
Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048400701728574openalex-snapshot
Implicational Paradoxes and the Meaning of Logical Constants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1093010openalex-snapshot
What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1544098openalex-snapshot
Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0013openalex-snapshot
True and False—As If
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/60.4.340openalex-snapshot
Minimalism, gaps, and the Holton conditional
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/analys/60.4.351openalex-snapshot
Relations in Lewis's framework without atoms: a correction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzaa021openalex-snapshot
Boolean negation and non-conservativity III: the Ackermann constant
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa031openalex-snapshot
Individual resource games and resource redistributions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exw012openalex-snapshot
Unified correspondence and proof theory for strict implication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/7.3.322openalex-snapshot
Prom Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2087663openalex-snapshot
Truth, the Liar, and Relativism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2020.006openalex-snapshot
Sorites, Curry and Suitable Models
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2024.022openalex-snapshot
Simplified semantics for further relevant logics II
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2143/lea.227.0.3053513openalex-snapshot
Semantic minimalism for logical constants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26021/2864openalex-snapshot
Normalized naive set theory.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v14i1.4031openalex-snapshot
Skolem Functions in Non-Classical Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5912openalex-snapshot
What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v18i2.6770openalex-snapshot
From Hilbert proofs to consecutions and back
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v18i5.6926openalex-snapshot
Relevant Arithmetic and Mathematical Pluralism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v1i0.1761openalex-snapshot
Three Schools of Paraconsistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v8i0.1814openalex-snapshot
Models for Substructural Arithmetics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.013openalex-snapshot
Comparing Substructural Theories of Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4324/9780203016244openalex-snapshot
An Introduction to Substructural Logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4324/9781315711683-11openalex-snapshot
Truth-makers, entailment and necessity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1602.05728openalex-snapshot
Some abstract versions of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem based on non-classical logics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1905.12944openalex-snapshot
A Non-repetitive Logic for Verification of Dynamic Memory with Explicit Heap Conjunction and Disjunction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2104.01667openalex-snapshot
A Logical Programming Language as an Instrument for Specifying and Verifying Dynamic Memory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2013110336openalex-snapshot
Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox
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