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Social Conventions

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831654
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Political Constitutionalism and the Value of Constitution Making
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Five Kinds of Perspectives on Legal Institutions
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Plan-Attitudes, Plan-Contents, and Bootstrapping: Some Thoughts on the Planning Theory of Law
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Legal Metaphoric Artifacts
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Moral Complications and Legal Structures
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Legal Realism and Functional Kinds: Michael Moore's Metaphysically Reductionist Naturalism
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David Lewis on Convention
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Social Diffusion Dynamics in Cyber–Physical–Human Systems
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Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference
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Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background
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Conventions, Reasons and the Law
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The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention
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Cooperative Conventions, Rules of Recognition and Institutional Practices
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Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin’s Criticisms
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An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science
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Sovereignty Outside of the Law
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Epistemic Authority and Legal Interpretation
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Data-Informed Modeling of the Formation, Persistence, and Evolution of Social Norms and Conventions
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Institutions and Constitutive Rules
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Constituting Power
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Constitutive Rules of Artificial Games and Natural Conventions of Ordinary Behavior
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Ethics of Sport: Origins, Main Approaches, and Future Challenges
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Interview with Professor Wil J. Waluchow
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The Application of Juristic Concepts in Legal Reasoning
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Appendix: Modes of Reasoning
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Are Fundamental Legal Reasons Internal? A Few Remarks on the Hartian Idea of the Internal Point of View
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On the Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review Be Morally Justified?
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Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference
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The Pragmatics of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making
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Phänomene der Sprache
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Interactive Decision-Making and Morality
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Conventionalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6519-1_104openalex-snapshot
Metaphysics of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6519-1_226openalex-snapshot
Is and Ought Distinction in Legal Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6519-1_362openalex-snapshot
Principles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6519-1_59openalex-snapshot
Ontology of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_101-1openalex-snapshot
Legal Conventionalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_104-2openalex-snapshot
Metaphysics of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_226-1openalex-snapshot
Is and Ought Distinction in Legal Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_362-1openalex-snapshot
Legal Principles (Contemporary Debates)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_59-1openalex-snapshot
Ontology of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03222-3openalex-snapshot
The speed offset problem: a case for principled cultural sensitivity in automated vehicle design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00821-8openalex-snapshot
Meaning, Communal Use and Deference to Experts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9313-8openalex-snapshot
Solidarity and Social Moral Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10494-zopenalex-snapshot
“When in Rome…”: on the Authority of Social Norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-010-9155-8openalex-snapshot
Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-024-09709-6openalex-snapshot
Expression of Affect and Illocution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-013-9191-4openalex-snapshot
The DNA of Conventions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-013-9203-4openalex-snapshot
Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy
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Erratum to: Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-018-9331-yopenalex-snapshot
Law as Authoritative Fiction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01674-5openalex-snapshot
On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01948-0openalex-snapshot
Conventionalism and contingency in promissory powers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01957-zopenalex-snapshot
Conventions without knowledge of conformity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-019-09660-1openalex-snapshot
Sources, Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09681-1openalex-snapshot
Procedural Acts as Double-Conventionalized Acts: Considerations on Conventional Acts Performed in a Courtroom Discourse
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03083-xopenalex-snapshot
Salience reasoning in coordination games
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In defence of constitutive rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9311-xopenalex-snapshot
Do Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09675-0openalex-snapshot
Behavioral Foundations for Expression Meaning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0050-2openalex-snapshot
Rules and Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00576-zopenalex-snapshot
How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009000536openalex-snapshot
The Metaphysics of Legal Facts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108233828.006openalex-snapshot
Consensus Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108555067.007openalex-snapshot
Theoretical Approaches
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108555067.014openalex-snapshot
Introducing Intercultural Ethics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.004openalex-snapshot
The Social Practice Account
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.006openalex-snapshot
The Conventionalist Reason Account
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108636377.017openalex-snapshot
Social-Practice Legal Positivism and the Normativity Thesis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108636377.024openalex-snapshot
Legal Positivism and Meta-Ethics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781108636377.025openalex-snapshot
The Normativity of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2024.15openalex-snapshot
Meaningfulness, Conventions, and Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511760082.006openalex-snapshot
The rule of law and the weight of politics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107707573.018openalex-snapshot
The authority of conventions, norms, and law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316442876.004openalex-snapshot
Market rules: Social conventions, legal fictions, and the organization of sovereign debt markets in the long twentieth century
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818313000416openalex-snapshot
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0034670520000388openalex-snapshot
Sir John Davies on Custom and the Common Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0075426923000642openalex-snapshot
Regulating free speech in a democracy: Lysias 10Against Theomnestosand the law on slander
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900006391openalex-snapshot
Law, Shared Activities, and Obligation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325216000070openalex-snapshot
NEGOTIATING THE MEANING OF “LAW”: THE METALINGUISTIC DIMENSION OF THE DISPUTE OVER LEGAL POSITIVISM
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-25953-1openalex-snapshot
Collective patterns of social diffusion are shaped by individual inertia and trend-seeking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_8openalex-snapshot
Convention and Ritual (Im)politeness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-47244-1_1openalex-snapshot
The Domain of Social Ontology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/9780230316645_1openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1057/9780230316645_10openalex-snapshot
Two Perspectives on the Requirements of a Practice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1721059115openalex-snapshot
The dynamics of norm change in the cultural evolution of language
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313101openalex-snapshot
The Reasons to Follow Conventional Practices
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2025.2464123openalex-snapshot
Judicial Power and the Intrinsic Normativity of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2016.1140072openalex-snapshot
Walking the tightrope: unrecognized conventions and arbitrariness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2075918openalex-snapshot
Rules as constitutive practices defined by correlated equilibria
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2012.675069openalex-snapshot
Broad Internalism, Deep Conventions, Moral Entrepreneurs, and Sport
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2015.1112240openalex-snapshot
The Normativity of Sport: A Historicist Take on Broad Internalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2018.1497513openalex-snapshot
Against deep conventionalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2015.1024874openalex-snapshot
Accounting for constitutive rules in game theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2239618openalex-snapshot
Political liberalism and the metaphysics of languages
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2019.1676945openalex-snapshot
Practices, Conventions, Problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2015.1094821openalex-snapshot
“Sport, Habermas, and the Moral Sphere: A Response to Lopez Frias”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2017.1292306openalex-snapshot
Did Armstrong Cheat?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2018.1530694openalex-snapshot
A Response to the Special Issue Contributors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2018.1561747openalex-snapshot
Armstrong was a Cheat: A Reply to Eric Moore
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2019.1566271openalex-snapshot
Formalism Conventionalized
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Morality and Socially Constructed Norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0002openalex-snapshot
What Are Socially Constructed Norms?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Grounding the Moral Force of Socially Constructed Norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0004openalex-snapshot
The Agency-Respect View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Grounding Moral Rights
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Grounding Political Obligation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Explaining the Wrong of Sovereignty Violations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780191938115.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Conclusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Structure of the Open Society
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.002.0004openalex-snapshot
Preface
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.002.0005openalex-snapshot
Glossary
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Social Practices
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Individual Autonomy, Identity, and Group Rights
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Social Institutions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Collective Responsibility for Just Institutions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Collective Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Corporate Responsibilities and Rights
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780197815182.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Conclusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780198925378.003.0019openalex-snapshot
Conventionalism and the Wrong of Promise-Breaking
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/9780198925378.003.0021openalex-snapshot
Law, the Rule of Law, and Goodness-Fixing Kinds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu072openalex-snapshot
A UNIFIED SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12050openalex-snapshot
Constitutional Conventions and the P rince of W ales
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00488.xopenalex-snapshot
When Conventionalism Goes Too Far*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00454.xopenalex-snapshot
Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12171openalex-snapshot
Convention and common ground
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12443openalex-snapshot
Notions of arbitrariness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12319openalex-snapshot
Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12309openalex-snapshot
The Questionable Presupposition Underlying Hartian Accounts of Legal Facts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12116openalex-snapshot
SNEAKY ASSERTIONS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12525openalex-snapshot
Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13008openalex-snapshot
Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13137openalex-snapshot
Can rules ground moral obligations?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12050openalex-snapshot
Political Constitutionalism and the Question of Constitution‐Making
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12097openalex-snapshot
The Legality of Self‐Constitution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12133openalex-snapshot
Law Is the Command of the Sovereign: H. L. A. Hart Reconsidered
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12142openalex-snapshot
The Intensionality behind Legal Concepts and Their Extensional Boundaries: Between Conventionalism and Interpretivism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12230openalex-snapshot
Flaws and Virtues ofAn Artifact Theory of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12331openalex-snapshot
In Defense of Hart’s Supposedly Refuted Theory of Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12370openalex-snapshot
Alf Ross on the Nature of Law
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12263openalex-snapshot
What use has approved
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0048393110363436openalex-snapshot
Marmor’s Social Conventions: The Limits of Practical Reason
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0048393113500215openalex-snapshot
Games, Rules, and Conventions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/0048393114543988openalex-snapshot
Must We Play to Win? A Reply to Morgan
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.14198/doxa2023.47.4openalex-snapshot
Metateoría pragmatista para una teoría de las normas jurídicas
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.14746/rpeis.2023.85.2.07openalex-snapshot
Conventional acts and their normative consequences: controversies over the Poznań concept of conventional acts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/ip-2025-0002openalex-snapshot
The cultural evolution of speech act norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013openalex-snapshot
Conventions and Constitutive Norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0001openalex-snapshot
The Beliefs-Rules-Equilibrium Account of Institutions: A Contribution to a Naturalistic Social Ontology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2026.235.6.137-152openalex-snapshot
Exclusionary Positivism in Anglo-American Legal Thought: Defining a Direction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.17951/sil.2018.27.1.27openalex-snapshot
The Authority of Precedents in Civil Law Systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.18601/01234366.n41.04openalex-snapshot
Una apuesta por el concepto de persona razonable: análisis a partir del contrato atípico de servicios logísticos
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4893148openalex-snapshot
Rethinking Conventions in Light of Sībawayhian and Post-Sībawayhian Pragmatics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2025.19.19534openalex-snapshot
Escepticismo jurídico y convenciones. Los límites del convencionalismo y el desafío de Dworkin
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2478/v10016-010-0008-8openalex-snapshot
Speech Acts, Criteria and Intentions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2025/18058openalex-snapshot
Guardrails for Human-AI Ecologies: Norm-Based Coordination and Design for Predictability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.30915/abd.1536827openalex-snapshot
ON THE NATURE OF AND SOME CHALLENGES TO PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies11010016openalex-snapshot
What Goals? Which Point? Whose Purpose? A Critical Engagement with Sport Internalism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.36253/979-12-215-0887-1.09openalex-snapshot
Il doping sportivo come problema bioetico nella filosofia dello sport
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2015.1.14openalex-snapshot
Why Legal Conventionalism Fails
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.38072/2751-9821/p11openalex-snapshot
Was sind literarische Praktiken?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/anso.141.0215openalex-snapshot
Performer par le dispositif ? Un retour critique sur la théorie de la performativité
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4646openalex-snapshot
Communicating Testimonial Commitment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/126b7openalex-snapshot
Constitutive conventions in law and the problem of their primacy
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Bibliographie
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3447openalex-snapshot
Rules and norms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3471openalex-snapshot
A new type of convention?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3658openalex-snapshot
Razonable estabilidad vs. indeterminación radical
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3698openalex-snapshot
Reasonable stability vs. radical indeterminacy
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Futbol i filozofia prawa: gra albo kaprys sędziego
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Justified epistemic authority (in legal interpretation)
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