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Individual Enforcement of Collective Liability in Premodern Europe

https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975628
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511819438openalex-snapshot
The Rise of the Western World
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.xopenalex-snapshot
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975493openalex-snapshot
Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975538openalex-snapshot
Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7767/zrgga.1910.31.1.282openalex-snapshot
IX. Das germanische Element im spanischen Rechte
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7767/zrgga.1916.37.1.591openalex-snapshot
Dr. Guido Kisch, Der deutsche Arrestprozeß in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1004445openalex-extracted
'Whatever Is, Is Right'? Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe (Tawney Lecture 2006)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1896603openalex-extracted
Epidemic Trade
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978194openalex-extracted
When Do Rulers Delegate Powers to Jurisdictions? The Independence of Medieval European Cities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2463598openalex-extracted
Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective: Part 1
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00008-3openalex-snapshot
Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2003.11.001openalex-snapshot
The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2011.12.002openalex-snapshot
What lessons for economic development can we draw from the Champagne fairs?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2013.08.001openalex-snapshot
Global economic governance during the middle ages: The jurisdiction of the champagne fairs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050718000487openalex-snapshot
Benefits of Empire? Capital Market Integration North and South of the Alps, 1350–1800
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0263675121000065openalex-snapshot
Legal culture in the Danelaw: a study of III Æthelred
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1108/s1529-2134(2010)0000013014openalex-snapshot
Instincts and institutions: the rise of the market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12472openalex-snapshot
Inter‐communal institutions in medieval trade
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13358openalex-snapshot
The emergence of double entry bookkeeping
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.70126openalex-snapshot
Hunting for Hollanders: The community responsibility system, trade sanctions, and public debt in the late‐medieval Low Countries
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2007.00408.xopenalex-snapshot
‘Whatever is, is right’? Economic institutions in pre‐industrial Europe1
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004201484.i-447.75openalex-snapshot
References
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/135406610394002openalex-snapshot
The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.4.169openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Guilds
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31743/amsn.18541openalex-snapshot
Pepper and Reprisals between Poland and Pera (1452)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781350250291-0111openalex-snapshot
Instincts and Institutions
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