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Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_349openalex-extracted

Settlement of Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_55openalex-extracted

Class Actions

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8openalex-extracted

Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01546-9openalex-extracted

Equilibrium formation of class action suits

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(88)90019-1openalex-extracted

The deterrent effects of settlements and trials

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00114-5openalex-extracted

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0144-8188(98)00005-2openalex-extracted

Capital structure, priority rules, and the settlement of civil claims

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/345678openalex-extracted

“Tied to the Mast”: Most‐Favored‐Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/377246openalex-extracted

Allocating Settlement Authority under a Contingent‐Fee Arrangement

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467916openalex-extracted

Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467917openalex-extracted

"Bad Faith" Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof Problem

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467933openalex-extracted

Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467935openalex-extracted

A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467984openalex-extracted

Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/468008openalex-extracted

The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/468068openalex-extracted

Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/1.2.737openalex-extracted

The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.2.295openalex-extracted

Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037066openalex-extracted

The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00425openalex-extracted

Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00027openalex-extracted

The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining*

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115856openalex-extracted

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF SETTLEMENT BARGAINING

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556016openalex-extracted

Contracting with Externalities

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.296openalex-extracted

Naked Exclusion: Comment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.310openalex-extracted

Naked Exclusion: Reply

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/093245608783742264openalex-extracted

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2008-0016openalex-extracted

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2008-0017openalex-extracted

Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1000209openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161193openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287925openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289016openalex-extracted

The Use of 'Most-Favored-Nation' Clauses in Settlement of Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.346260openalex-extracted

Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556163openalex-extracted

Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593720openalex-extracted

Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556069openalex-extracted

Hush Money

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3087444openalex-extracted

The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3087476openalex-extracted

Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w10943openalex-extracted

Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w2347openalex-extracted

One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-xopenalex-snapshot

One share-one vote and the market for corporate control

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593703openalex-snapshot

Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahu012openalex-snapshot

Trial Incentives in Sequential Litigation

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jla/1.2.737openalex-snapshot

The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1085282openalex-snapshot

Plaintiffs Exploiting Plaintiffs

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2462814openalex-snapshot

Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment

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