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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1213158

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800100126openalex-extracted
N‐person games in partition function form
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2688openalex-extracted
Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00162117openalex-extracted
Centralized vote-trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03187594openalex-extracted
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00093-2openalex-extracted
Party governance and ideological bias
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00254-0openalex-extracted
A model of political parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055400265209openalex-extracted
Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051713openalex-extracted
Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48openalex-extracted
Equilibrium points in n -person games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/121/32openalex-extracted
Theory of games and economic behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001openalex-extracted
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00306.xopenalex-extracted
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00450.xopenalex-extracted
Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935070openalex-extracted
Parties as Political Intermediaries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.974openalex-extracted
Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/003231875500700206openalex-extracted
Book Review: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State by Maurice Duverger. Methuen, 1954. 439 pages.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1628/093245608786534613openalex-extracted
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.546627openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1232672openalex-extracted
The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111082openalex-extracted
The Uncovered Set and the Core
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111098openalex-extracted
Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111120openalex-extracted
A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2669309openalex-extracted
Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3088416openalex-extracted
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888openalex-extracted
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.31-0579openalex-extracted
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226012773.001.0001openalex-extracted
Why Parties?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226452739.001.0001openalex-extracted
Pivotal Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7907/crqbr-xmr36openalex-extracted
Voting Blocs, Coalitions and Parties

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000050openalex-snapshot
Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies
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