On the public citation graph

Do Effective Boards and Strong Corporate Control Markets Enhance or Depress Market Valuation of R&D?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361509
0 signed · 21 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2007.07.002openalex-extracted
Multiple directorships and corporate diversification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005openalex-extracted
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.143108openalex-extracted
The Value-Relevance of Intangibles: The Case of Software Capitalization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.149515openalex-extracted
Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring Following Performance Declines
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.167288openalex-extracted
Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.195488openalex-extracted
The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231582openalex-extracted
Board Characteristics and Audit Fees
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299159openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556032openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607364openalex-extracted
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.665746openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.729935openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.93988openalex-extracted
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94034openalex-extracted
Separation of Ownership and Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v27.n2.82openalex-extracted
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005openalex-snapshot
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008openalex-snapshot
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006openalex-snapshot
Board size and the variability of corporate performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.004openalex-snapshot
The determinants of board structure☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020217817156openalex-snapshot
Excess Returns to R&D-Intensive Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00405openalex-snapshot
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.