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Democracy and Electoral Processes

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00119353openalex-extracted
Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133748openalex-extracted
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00135548openalex-extracted
Does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents?: The theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00138162openalex-extracted
Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978?84
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00993852openalex-extracted
Public opinion and heuristic processing of source cues
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01053266openalex-extracted
Informative and persuasive campaigning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03187594openalex-extracted
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4750-3openalex-extracted
Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5openalex-extracted
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90091-6openalex-extracted
Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139174954openalex-extracted
Making Votes Count
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055400189580openalex-extracted
The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402004276openalex-extracted
Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400000338openalex-extracted
The Vanishing Marginals and Electoral Responsiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004915813976openalex-extracted
Additional incumbent spending really can harm (at least some) incumbents: An analysis of vote share maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018383014433openalex-extracted
The effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes: A data envelopment analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261954openalex-extracted
Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/444405openalex-extracted
Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467360openalex-extracted
How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/468041openalex-extracted
Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1089/153312902760137578openalex-extracted
The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942–2000
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1089/1533129042389604openalex-extracted
The Party Line
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2006.5.425openalex-extracted
Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2007.6204openalex-extracted
The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00371.xopenalex-extracted
Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382148openalex-extracted
Endogenous Political Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287694openalex-extracted
The Benefits of 'Judicially Unmanageable' Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.578304openalex-extracted
Paying for Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1073930openalex-extracted
Garrett's Temptation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1073931openalex-extracted
The Theory of Political Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1122890openalex-extracted
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1123502openalex-extracted
The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1123800openalex-extracted
Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1229320openalex-extracted
Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1229321openalex-extracted
The "Political Market" Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1229326openalex-extracted
The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1342611openalex-extracted
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1342612openalex-extracted
In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1599501openalex-extracted
Statutes' Domains
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1907278openalex-extracted
The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913287openalex-extracted
Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957176openalex-extracted
Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957392openalex-extracted
Explaining Senate Election Outcomes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1957570openalex-extracted
A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1958779openalex-extracted
Parties as Utility Maximizers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1958782openalex-extracted
The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1960638openalex-extracted
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2110770openalex-extracted
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111172openalex-extracted
A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111212openalex-extracted
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111355openalex-extracted
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111445openalex-extracted
Patterns of Congressional Voting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334openalex-extracted
Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2952264openalex-extracted
Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3088416openalex-extracted
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3312869openalex-extracted
Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/4150629openalex-extracted
Reapportionment and Party Realignment in the American States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/421293openalex-extracted
The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w9409openalex-extracted
Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.105376openalex-extracted
Positive Political Theory II
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452240206.n14openalex-extracted
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483302775.n228openalex-extracted
Reynolds v. Sims
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265774.n1303openalex-extracted
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4135/9781604265774.n507openalex-extracted
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative PAC (1985)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042292openalex-extracted
Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315699868-149openalex-extracted
Colegrove v. Green (1946)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226012773.001.0001openalex-extracted
Why Parties?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226238111.001.0001openalex-extracted
Law and Public Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226772875.001.0001openalex-extracted
The Reasoning Voter
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511720468openalex-snapshot
Reasoning and Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404041395openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/scer.14.3655312openalex-snapshot
"Politics as Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections

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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2684559openalex-snapshot
A View Across the Atlantic: The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States and Europe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-09502018000200193openalex-snapshot
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