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A Lender of Last Resort for Public Banks? Theory and an Application to Japan Post Bank

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-29744-6openalex-extracted

Progress toward Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9343-5openalex-extracted

Ideologies, vested interest groups, and postal saving privatization in Japan

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.004openalex-extracted

Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.02.007openalex-extracted

Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00199-6openalex-extracted

Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/595697openalex-extracted

Political Determinants of Government Loans in Japan

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199242948.003.0018openalex-extracted

Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyl002openalex-extracted

Storming the Castle: The Battle for Postal Reform in Japan

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00422openalex-extracted

Government Ownership of Banks

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00305.xopenalex-extracted

AN OPTIMAL SCHEME FOR INJECTING PUBLIC FUNDS UNDER THE MORAL HAZARD INCENTIVE FOR BANKS

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.xopenalex-extracted

Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2005.0027openalex-extracted

The Politics of Postal Savings Reform in Japan

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0057openalex-extracted

Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? an Incomplete Contracts Model: A Comment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.600901openalex-extracted

Banks Without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-Out Policies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914132openalex-extracted

Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2235248openalex-extracted

A Theory of Privatisation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226060231.001.0001openalex-extracted

Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7916/d8k07btvopenalex-extracted

Postal banking in the United States and Japan: A comparative analysis

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2601196openalex-snapshot

Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model

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