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Party Formation and Policy Outcomes Under Different Electoral Systems
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2688openalex-extracted
Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_9openalex-extracted
Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_15openalex-extracted
A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625671openalex-extracted
Making and Breaking Governments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400004130openalex-extracted
Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/0116042openalex-extracted
On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466278openalex-extracted
Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555136openalex-extracted
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.3.225openalex-extracted
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1958776openalex-extracted
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1962882openalex-extracted
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111120openalex-extracted
A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2111355openalex-extracted
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2952264openalex-extracted
Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w7097openalex-extracted
Political Economics and Public Finance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/317686openalex-snapshot
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2107239openalex-extracted
Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00254-0openalex-snapshot
A model of political parties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511614385.010openalex-snapshot
Political Parties and Coalition Formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12235openalex-snapshot
Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1360897openalex-snapshot
Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs. Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2432910openalex-snapshot
Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.563301openalex-snapshot
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.907289openalex-snapshot
Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/g13040048openalex-snapshot
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
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