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Only the Final Outcome Matters: Persistent Effects of Efforts in Dynamic Moral Hazard
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2openalex-extracted
Repeated moral hazard with persistence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90026-4openalex-extracted
Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-oopenalex-extracted
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.017openalex-extracted
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00510.xopenalex-extracted
Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00006.xopenalex-extracted
Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238openalex-extracted
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297391openalex-extracted
The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297879openalex-extracted
Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937915openalex-extracted
Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938317openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003562openalex-extracted
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003645openalex-extracted
Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11606/t.12.2011.tde-27012012-202215openalex-snapshot
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