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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645196
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4315-2openalex-extracted
The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The “Costs” of Managed Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00045-3openalex-extracted
National vs European incentive policies: Bargaining, information and coordination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00055-0openalex-extracted
Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-008045030-8/50011-4openalex-extracted
Competition in the Continental European Electricity Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00139-1openalex-extracted
The subsidiarity bias in regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511619151openalex-extracted
The Architecture of Government
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050701025025openalex-extracted
STATE PROMOTION AND REGULATION OF THE TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY, 1845–1860
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050708000818openalex-extracted
Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020822720063openalex-extracted
The History of Electricity Restructuring in California
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040600996991openalex-extracted
Explaining Fiscal Decentralisation: Geography, Colonial History, Economic Development and Political Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466579openalex-extracted
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467024openalex-extracted
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566358.003.0011openalex-extracted
European Union Regulation and Competition Policy among the Energy Utilities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566358.003.0012openalex-extracted
Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or Divergence?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpi021openalex-extracted
Utility price regulation and time inconsistency: comparisons with monetary policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8292.00099openalex-extracted
Falling Water: The Origins of Direct Federal Participation in the US Electric Utility Industry, 1902–1933
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1995.tb00237.xopenalex-extracted
Why Liberalisation Needs Centralisation: Subsidiarity and EU Telecoms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00311.xopenalex-extracted
Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal‐Agent Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01049.xopenalex-extracted
Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1995.tb00531.xopenalex-extracted
Disarming the Commission: The Debate over a European Cartel Office
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355305775097579openalex-extracted
The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.44.2.325openalex-extracted
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.44.2.367openalex-extracted
Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.83openalex-extracted
Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0016openalex-extracted
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400878789openalex-extracted
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927709openalex-extracted
International Competition, Economics of Federalism, and Competence Allocation Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1073769openalex-extracted
On Federalism and Economic Development
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2098020openalex-extracted
Scale Economies, Imperfect Competition, and Public Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555512openalex-extracted
Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555915openalex-extracted
Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2586211openalex-extracted
Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781843767305.00006openalex-extracted
A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism
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