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What Makes Insurance Companies Voluntarily Share Proprietary Customer Information?

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(98)00038-1openalex-extracted

Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262111openalex-extracted

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/379936openalex-extracted

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9939-1952-0046638-5openalex-extracted

A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.1.205openalex-extracted

Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02427.xopenalex-extracted

Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05125.xopenalex-extracted

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.12968/sece.2005.5.425openalex-extracted

Watching me, watching you

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326openalex-extracted

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297588openalex-extracted

The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w13752openalex-extracted

Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7916/d8v12ft1openalex-extracted

Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0117openalex-snapshot

A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly

What points at this work

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12103openalex-snapshot

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