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A Model of Party Discipline in Congress

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1813699
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
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Comparing constitutions:
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The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
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Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox
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Principled Agents?
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Equilibrium Party Government
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Incumbents' Interests and Gender Quotas
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Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000
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Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
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Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds
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Contestable Leadership: Party Leaders as Principals and Agents
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Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
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Tying Your EnemyS Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil
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Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society
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Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
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Voters as Fiscal Conservatives
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Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel
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Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
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Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
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Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
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Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork
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An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
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Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics
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How Strong Should Our Party Be? Party Member Preferences Over Party Cohesion
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Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics
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Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
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A political agency model of coattail voting
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