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Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1018openalex-extracted
Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0650openalex-extracted
Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0108openalex-extracted
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2236openalex-extracted
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68409-1_3openalex-extracted
Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0_14openalex-extracted
A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050014openalex-extracted
Sequencing R&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-jopenalex-extracted
Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.012openalex-extracted
Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261312openalex-extracted
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001openalex-extracted
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000813openalex-extracted
COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000165openalex-extracted
DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539openalex-extracted
Supermodularity and Complementarity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882168-018openalex-extracted
16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526710openalex-extracted
First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555388openalex-extracted
von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888openalex-extracted
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781009888.00011openalex-extracted
Endogenous formation of economic coalitions: a survey of the partition function approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781845421441.00019openalex-extracted
A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0687openalex-snapshot
Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.003openalex-snapshot
Endogenous price leadership
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