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Do Non-Executive Directors and Institutional Shareholders Influence Firm Performance? Evidence from UK

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1927874

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Corporate Governance

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Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

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Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report

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Institutional Investors Exercising Shareholder Voting Rights in Japan

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The appeal report — prepared for the central computer and telecommunications agency (HM treasury)

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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

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Determinants of corporate borrowing

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Management ownership and market valuation

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The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations

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Outside directors and CEO turnover

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Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-copenalex-extracted

Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-fopenalex-extracted

Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5openalex-extracted

Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors

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A comparison of the properties of realized variance for the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 equity indices

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Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

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The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions

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A stake in the future: the stakeholding solution

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Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: Evidence from the UK

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00018-2openalex-extracted

Institutional ownership and firm performance: The case of bidder returns

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(99)00016-4openalex-extracted

Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1569-3732(04)09012-7openalex-extracted

ON THE MONITORING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: THE CASE OF THE ADOPTION OF CADBURY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE U.K.

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Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers

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Urban Europe

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Public Transport in Dhaka: Organizational, Funding, and Financing Issues for Sustainable Development

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Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467037openalex-extracted

Separation of Ownership and Control

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Introduction to Company Law

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198289906.003.0003openalex-extracted

Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control And Management Roles Of Non-Executive Directors

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/00483480410550161openalex-extracted

Directors' remuneration

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/01140580810872870openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance and Accountability

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.35053openalex-extracted

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.45483openalex-extracted

Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00298openalex-extracted

Will Executive Pay Globalise Along American Lines?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00428openalex-extracted

The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00511openalex-extracted

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

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The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems

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A Survey of Corporate Governance

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Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.xopenalex-extracted

Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264173705-enopenalex-extracted

OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120204openalex-extracted

Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor Their Investee Firms?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.133808openalex-extracted

The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1391803openalex-extracted

Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571046openalex-extracted

Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286440openalex-extracted

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Performance of UK Firms

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.314276openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.314619openalex-extracted

Board Structure and Agency Costs

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354380openalex-extracted

Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions: A Natural Experiment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.439500openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.470801openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance: A Survey of the Literature

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.47271openalex-extracted

Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.500262openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.676971openalex-extracted

Firm Performance: Do Non-Executive Directors Have a Mind of Their Own? Evidence from Uk Panel Data

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.877807openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance - Independent Directors and Financial Performance: An Empirical Analysis

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94034openalex-extracted

Separation of Ownership and Control

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965559openalex-extracted

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1066523openalex-extracted

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1123383openalex-extracted

The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1992329openalex-extracted

Credit Markets and the Control of Capital

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2235027openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297430openalex-extracted

Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2329497openalex-extracted

A Survey of Corporate Governance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2331397openalex-extracted

Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v27.n2.82openalex-extracted

Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v42.n3.52openalex-extracted

Corporate Governance in the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203779071-9openalex-extracted

Introduction to company law

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781845429997openalex-extracted

International Corporate Governance

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq081openalex-snapshot

Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq145openalex-snapshot

Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3665947openalex-snapshot

Firm Value and External Blockholdings

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