On the public citation graph
Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? An Experiment on Auditing Rules
0 signed · 35 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199806/08)19:4/5<259::aid-mde890>3.3.co;2-uopenalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24244-9_2openalex-extracted
A Behavioral Accounting Study of Strategic Interaction in a Tax Compliance Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4openalex-extracted
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1openalex-extracted
Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2openalex-extracted
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0openalex-extracted
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90003-5openalex-extracted
Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90091-7openalex-extracted
Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01525-6openalex-extracted
Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(82)90006-xopenalex-extracted
Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: An experimental approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(92)90017-2openalex-extracted
Tax changes and economic behavior: The case of tax evasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.002openalex-extracted
Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance: From theory to intervention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2008.10.004openalex-extracted
Sequences of audits, tax compliance, and taxpaying strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.005openalex-extracted
Tax evasion and social interactions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.10.007openalex-extracted
Getting the word out: Enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.065openalex-extracted
Dynamic behaviour in tax evasion: An experimental approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00033-5openalex-extracted
Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1053-5357(03)00040-4openalex-extracted
To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13501780500342906openalex-extracted
Experiments in economics: External validity and the robustness of phenomena
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbh045openalex-extracted
The Good, the Bad, and the Regulator: An Experimental Test of Two Conditional Audit Schemes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00185openalex-extracted
Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1993.tb02405.xopenalex-extracted
Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00512.xopenalex-extracted
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124openalex-extracted
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2006.4.04openalex-extracted
Do Audits Enhance Compliance? An Empirical Assessment of VAT Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937855openalex-extracted
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937932openalex-extracted
Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w7473openalex-extracted
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9113openalex-extracted
Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199806/08)19:4/5<259::aid-mde890>3.0.co;2-2openalex-snapshot
Extending the lessons of laboratory experiments on tax compliance to managerial and decision economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.02.003openalex-snapshot
Tax compliance as a coordination game
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.