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The Mystery of the Market for Corporate Control: Takeover Likelihood of Underperforming Firms
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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Firm‐diversification effects on performance as measured by tobin's q
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Predicting takeover targets
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Corporate governance and hostile takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-extracted
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(77)90043-5openalex-extracted
Tender offers and stockholder returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(80)90019-7openalex-extracted
Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1openalex-extracted
The market for corporate control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(83)90005-3openalex-extracted
Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-xopenalex-extracted
Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6openalex-extracted
Managerial control of voting rights
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90040-2openalex-extracted
Corporate control contests and capital structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7openalex-extracted
Management ownership and market valuation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0openalex-extracted
Outside directors and CEO turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(91)90005-5openalex-extracted
A test of the free cash flow hypothesis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00777-xopenalex-extracted
Corporate focus and stock returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00794-2openalex-extracted
Asset sales and increase in focus
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00798-6openalex-extracted
Diversification's effect on firm value
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00807-dopenalex-extracted
Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00840-bopenalex-extracted
Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(85)90038-xopenalex-extracted
The characteristics of takeover targets and other measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0927-5398(94)90007-8openalex-extracted
Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00073-xopenalex-extracted
Takeover risk and the market for corporate control: the experience of British firms in the 1970s and 1980s
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1057-5219(00)00022-3openalex-extracted
The identification of U.K. takeover targets using published historical cost accounting data Some empirical evidence comparing logit with linear discriminant analysis and raw financial ratios with industry-relative ratios
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Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0960310042000280492openalex-extracted
The role of hostile takeovers in corporate governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/259000openalex-extracted
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/296114openalex-extracted
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00201openalex-extracted
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1991.tb00586.xopenalex-extracted
Corporate Raiders and Takeover Targets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1996.tb00912.xopenalex-extracted
TAKEOVER ACTIVITY, CEO TURNOVER, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03646.xopenalex-extracted
The Capital Structure Puzzle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03893.xopenalex-extracted
A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03921.xopenalex-extracted
Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03758.xopenalex-extracted
Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2000.tb01409.xopenalex-extracted
Industry Distributional Characteristics of Financial Ratios: An Acquisition Theory Application
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2005.00031.xopenalex-extracted
The Fate of Firms: Explaining Mergers and Bankruptcies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.7openalex-extracted
Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/orms.2018.05.01openalex-extracted
20 years later, GBD still ahead of his time
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.155168openalex-extracted
Takeover Likelihood Models for UK Quoted Companies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244158openalex-extracted
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.48304openalex-extracted
Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934313openalex-extracted
The UK Code of Corporate Governance: Link between Compliance and Firm Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1071435openalex-extracted
Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2098200openalex-extracted
The Financial Characteristics of Firms and Theories of Merger Activity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2230895openalex-extracted
Take-overs, Economic Natural Selection, and the Theory of The Firm: Evidence from the Postwar United Kingdom Experience
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2232449openalex-extracted
Factors Affecting the Probability of Being Acquired: Evidence for the United States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2331110openalex-extracted
The Information Content of Dividend Changes: Cash Flow Signaling, Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2331141openalex-extracted
The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2552903openalex-extracted
Take-Overs: Their Relevance to the Stock Market and the Theory of the Firm.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3665778openalex-extracted
Contributions of Diversification, Promotion, and R&D to the Value of Multiproduct Firms: A Tobin's q Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/4126741openalex-extracted
Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w2295openalex-extracted
Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4013/base.20082.07openalex-extracted
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.xopenalex-snapshot
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w2532openalex-snapshot
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
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