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Enforceable vs. Non-Enforceable Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal with Fair Players

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153113
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470752937.ch24openalex-extracted
Behavioral Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1243openalex-extracted
Are non‐binding contracts really not worth the paper?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027openalex-extracted
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0023-1openalex-extracted
Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5openalex-extracted
Psychological games and sequential rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008openalex-extracted
Honesty and informal agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.011openalex-extracted
Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010openalex-extracted
The aversion to lying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.019openalex-extracted
Explicit versus implicit contracts for dividing the benefits of cooperation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009422314.012openalex-extracted
Behavioral Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511610240.008openalex-extracted
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466942openalex-extracted
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467902openalex-extracted
Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467908openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/law001openalex-extracted
Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00269openalex-extracted
Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00419.xopenalex-extracted
Do people tip strategically, to improve future service? Theory and evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.xopenalex-extracted
Promises and Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.xopenalex-extracted
Fairness and Contract Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12099openalex-extracted
Do Non-Enforceable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Lab Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041312openalex-extracted
Rethinking Reciprocity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003465398557537openalex-extracted
The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828662openalex-extracted
Deception: The Role of Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/002205103771800013openalex-extracted
Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.170openalex-extracted
Guilt in Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.177openalex-extracted
Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1751openalex-extracted
Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1341openalex-extracted
Norms and Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.203308openalex-extracted
Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2211openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.380083openalex-extracted
Promises and Partnership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.459587openalex-extracted
Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1290478openalex-extracted
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010openalex-extracted
Job Market Signaling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885060openalex-extracted
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1885099openalex-extracted
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912116openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912562openalex-extracted
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390openalex-extracted
Strategic Information Transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913604openalex-extracted
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2090458openalex-extracted
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171941openalex-extracted
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555872openalex-extracted
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938208openalex-extracted
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3438925openalex-extracted
The Limits of Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15openalex-extracted
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w1813openalex-extracted
The Rigidity of Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429494338-12openalex-extracted
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781847204158.00033openalex-extracted
Ideals, Conformism and Reciprocity: A Model of Individual Choice with Conformist Motivations, and an Application to the Not-for-Profit Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/b:exec.0000026979.14590.3copenalex-snapshot
How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3312639openalex-snapshot
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms
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