On the public citation graph

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2439379

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24243-0_5openalex-extracted
Experimental Evidence on the Endogenous Entry of Bidders in Internet Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-011-9095-2openalex-extracted
Vettes and lemons on eBay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9257-5openalex-extracted
eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.001openalex-extracted
Competition among auctioneers in large markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139052276.004openalex-extracted
Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00455openalex-extracted
Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323015472openalex-extracted
Competing Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344632openalex-extracted
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0022051041409075openalex-extracted
Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1100.0561openalex-extracted
The Sealed-Bid Abstraction in Online Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0691openalex-extracted
Research Note—Strategic Bid-Shading and Sequential Auctioning with Learning from Past Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.43.3.462openalex-extracted
Forward-Looking Bidding in Online Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543835openalex-extracted
An Estimable Demand System for a Large Auction Platform Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041558openalex-extracted
Identification in the Roy Model with an Application to Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.376362openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.468847openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.880780openalex-extracted
'Vettes and Lemons on Ebay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.949418openalex-extracted
Searching the Ebay Marketplace
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-extracted
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/20650326openalex-extracted
Overlapping Online Auctions: Empirical Characterization of Bidder Strategies and Auction Prices1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951643openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w10105openalex-extracted
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w22375openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Demand Estimation in Auction Markets
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