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Incentives to Coordinate in Organizations

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0830openalex-extracted

Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2359openalex-extracted

A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/redy.1998.0023openalex-extracted

Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00122574openalex-extracted

Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211783openalex-extracted

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-005-2263-zopenalex-extracted

Allocation of Decision-making Authority

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4openalex-extracted

z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7openalex-extracted

Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-7506-9749-1.50005-3openalex-extracted

The Use of Knowledge in Society

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001openalex-extracted

Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014openalex-extracted

An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender–receiver game

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.006openalex-extracted

Authority and communication in the laboratory

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003openalex-extracted

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004openalex-extracted

How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007openalex-extracted

A two-person game of information transmission

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.001openalex-extracted

The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.007openalex-extracted

Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014openalex-extracted

Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/508031openalex-extracted

Adaptive Organizations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/121.4.1133openalex-extracted

A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00287openalex-extracted

Arms Races and Negotiations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00227openalex-extracted

Authority and Communication in Organizations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00316openalex-extracted

An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12020openalex-extracted

How Do Market Prices and Cheap Talk Affect Coordination?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.xopenalex-extracted

Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00518.xopenalex-extracted

Governing Adaptation -super-1

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.591.xopenalex-extracted

Strategic Communication Networks

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00544.xopenalex-extracted

The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12054openalex-extracted

Delegation in Multi‐Establishment Firms: Evidence from I.T. Purchasing

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040927openalex-extracted

Belief Elicitation in the Laboratory

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.121.4.1133openalex-extracted

A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.984openalex-extracted

Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1892openalex-extracted

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1325openalex-extracted

The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.669openalex-extracted

A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130100openalex-extracted

Organizing to Adapt and Compete

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170403openalex-extracted

Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1277169openalex-extracted

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681273openalex-extracted

Monitoring Your Friends, Not Your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1862020openalex-extracted

The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390openalex-extracted

Strategic Information Transmission

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185openalex-extracted

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118488openalex-extracted

Communication in Coordination Games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951491openalex-extracted

Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/qe500openalex-extracted

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035352623.00029openalex-extracted

Exchange Economies and Loss Exposure: Experiments Exploring Prospect Theory and Competitive Equilibria in Market Environments

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783476213.00013openalex-extracted

Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00336openalex-snapshot

Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100309xopenalex-snapshot

COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.145openalex-snapshot

When Does Coordination Require Centralization?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.77openalex-snapshot

Organizing for Synergies

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.1.280openalex-snapshot

Too Many Products: Decentralized Decision Making in Multinational Firms

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/qe500openalex-snapshot

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

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