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Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2538638
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0616openalex-extracted
Iterated Expectations and Common Priors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2592openalex-extracted
Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41openalex-extracted
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01075202openalex-extracted
Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770224openalex-extracted
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1openalex-extracted
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8openalex-extracted
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1openalex-extracted
Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4openalex-extracted
Epistemic Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.007openalex-extracted
Signaling and mediation in games with common interest
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.012openalex-extracted
Intrinsic correlation in games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.010openalex-extracted
Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00543-2openalex-extracted
Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00016-2openalex-extracted
Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811227332_0007openalex-extracted
Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1494889openalex-extracted
Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1971201openalex-extracted
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978164openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.798944openalex-extracted
Topologies on Types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1073openalex-extracted
Rationalization and Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1637openalex-extracted
Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154openalex-extracted
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913562openalex-extracted
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171725openalex-extracted
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11105openalex-extracted
Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12563openalex-snapshot
Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality
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