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To Know or Not To Know: Strategic Inattention and Endogenous Market Structure

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2549458
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300142openalex-extracted
Positive value of information in games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9341-4openalex-extracted
Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(92)90008-mopenalex-extracted
Relative performance evaluation of management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00699-bopenalex-extracted
On the value of information in multi-agent decision theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90026-qopenalex-extracted
On the value of information in a strategic conflict
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53238-1.00004-1openalex-extracted
Rational Inattention and Monetary Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.08.001openalex-extracted
Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.001openalex-extracted
General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.09.001openalex-extracted
Large and small firms in a global market: David vs. Goliath
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2006.04.032openalex-extracted
Profit maximization, industry structure, and competition: A critique of neoclassical theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(95)00129-8openalex-extracted
Asymmetric information as a commitment in oligopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00203-7openalex-extracted
Delegation and firms’ ability to collude
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9openalex-extracted
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00021openalex-extracted
Agglomeration and Trade Revisited*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12027openalex-extracted
Entry, exit, and the determinants of market structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02185.xopenalex-extracted
Stackelberg Competition with Endogenous Entry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00168.xopenalex-extracted
Competition among the big and the small
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1367openalex-extracted
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697523openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/134972openalex-extracted
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2232877openalex-extracted
Delegation and the Theory of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2291741openalex-extracted
Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526507openalex-extracted
Stable Cartels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555525openalex-extracted
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555609openalex-extracted
The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2696410openalex-extracted
The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003317openalex-extracted
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w5648openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00180openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00463.xopenalex-snapshot
Market Size, Trade, and Productivity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/001979399004300303openalex-snapshot
Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0146389openalex-snapshot
Perfect Information vs Random Investigation: Safety Guidelines for a Consumer in the Jungle of Product Differentiation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3390/math12101576openalex-snapshot
The Rise of the Superstars: Uncovering the Composition Effect of International Trade That Cements the Dominant Position of Big Businesses
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.